THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 161 NEW YORK • SATURDAY • DECEMBER 22, 1945 NUMBER 25, PART 1

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Published weekly and copyright, 1945, in the U. S. A. by The Nation Associates, Inc., 20 Vesey St., New York 7, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 13, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 318 Kellogg Building.

The Shape of Things

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON CHINA enunciates a policy which, if adhered to, will have sweeping effects. In so many words it demands unified democratic rule as the condition of American economic aid. This means that the Kuomintang, in order to survive, must not only make peace with the Communists and the lesser democratic groups but take them into the government. It means that the Communists must not only enter the government, as they are entirely willing to do, but relinquish their claim to autonomous rule in the provinces they now dominate. It means the end of separate armies. There are those who will oppose the new policy as interventionist—and understandably, for American intervention, political or military, calls up ugly associations in many parts of the world. But today, despite Mr. Welles, intervention is not to be avoided. Whether we give or withhold diplomatic recognition, or goods, or loans, our action spells stability or collapse to smaller or weaker states. By merely selling a nation oil we can keep a dictator in power. Our liberal non-interventionists are defending a cause that was lost before 1939. The undeniable danger that pressure will be exercised in support of private interests or reactionary political groups is no longer to be averted by attacking intervention as a policy. It can be averted only if the people of the United States insist that this country's immense influence be used—as the President apparently proposes to use it—to back the effective popular elements in other less powerful nations. Mr. Truman's pronouncement will echo in capitals far from Chungking: if seriously applied it will force Franco and Perón out of power and establish democratic rule at Madrid and Buenos Aires. Its implications should be thoroughly discussed at Moscow, for eventually, if it is to be more than a beneficent form of big-power domination, the policy of intervention in support of representative government must be elaborated and applied by the UNO.

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THOUGH THE RUSSIAN DEMAND THAT FRANCO be named a war criminal aroused little enthusiasm on the part of its Allies, the Franco regime is on trial at Nürnberg just the same. By using Count Ciano's diary as evidence the Interallied Military Tribunal has established the authenticity of that astonishing document, with its important revelations of the role played by fascist Spain during the war. "By September, 1940," says the diary as summarized in the New York *Times* last July, "the grandiose plan for an invasion of England was scrapped. Italy and Spain each wanted a share in the glory of defeating Great Britain. Having previously

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turned down Italy, Hitler also rejected Franco's help in the enterprise because he said it would cost more than it was worth to have Spain's cooperation." Probably the chief reason why Hitler rejected Franco's offer was that he had already committed his country to its greatest blunder—abandoning the plan to invade Britain in favor of an attack on Russia. But the offer was there. Later Franco contributed the Blue Division to the Russian campaign and made the most of this gesture in his anti-Soviet and anti-Allied propaganda in Latin America. Another later Nazi idea, to seize the Canaries and the Azores as a preliminary move against the United States, called for the active participation of Spain. Ciano's assertions, now accepted by the Allies, finally disposed of Franco's cynical pretense that he always opposed war with the United Nations. Apart from all the earlier evidence against him, these revelations provide sufficient material to justify a general break with fascist Spain. The French proposal of a conference with Britain and the United States on the question of relations with Franco suggests that the present anomalous situation cannot last indefinitely. And further encouragement was provided by the visit last Saturday of Dr. Juan Negrín to Acting Secretary of State Acheson, an event which aroused intense interest and speculation in diplomatic circles.

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THE WORTHLESS MEASURE SUBSTITUTED FOR the original Full Employment Bill by its opponents in the House, and then passed last week, eliminates the principle of government responsibility for full employment and merely sets up a fact-finding mechanism to advise the President on employment prospects. The President is permitted to make recommendations on the basis of this advice, but chiefly as to means for encouraging private enterprise. In emphasis and outlook it is a profits-for-all, not jobs-for-all measure. Rather than oppose this sham bill and make full employment the chief issue of the 1946 elections, the Administration compromised in the hope of salvaging something out of the wreckage in a Senate-House conference. But experience has shown that, in the matter of creating jobs, half a loaf is not necessarily better than no loaf at all. Half-hearted measures for increasing employment such as were taken during the 1930's often have the effect of disturbing business "confidence" without creating the purchasing power necessary to maintain production at a high level and assure employment.

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THE HOUSE OF COMMONS HAS APPROVED BOTH the Anglo-American loan agreement and Bretton Woods, but it has done so without enthusiasm. For reasons which our London correspondent, Aylmer Vallance, explains on page 679, many Britons regard the loan terms as harsh and fear they include commitments which will be difficult, if not impossible, for Britain to fulfil. A good many people in this country, among them the editors of *The Nation,* share this view, though they realize that the prevailing state of American opinion ruled out a more generous agreement. Mr. Vallance shows that while the loan offers certain immediate advantages, it may well involve Britain in a financial crisis early in the fifties unless meanwhile the United States adapts its economic policies to its creditor status and takes positive steps to acquire a permanent import surplus. Since this will require not only a reversal of traditional American commercial policy but the achievement of a high and stable level of employment, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Britain is being asked to gamble on a "miracle." Yet it should be pointed out that if Britain had refused the loan and rejected the concomitant policies of cooperation with the United States, it would have involved itself, and the world, in an even more dangerous gamble. It would then have been forced to organize a self-sufficient economic bloc with the Empire as the nucleus. It would have had to use pressure tactics to induce countries whose supplies and markets it needed to deal with it on a barter basis. It would have been caught up in a Schachtian web of discriminatory practices bound to create serious political tensions. In such circumstances it would be still harder for Britain to lighten its international and imperial liabilities, a step which may well be as Mr. Vallance argues an essential condition of its future political and economic solvency.

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AS THE LABOR SITUATION GROWS MORE ACUTE, it also becomes simpler. Masks are dropped by both sides; the class struggle is back, no longer concealed under wartime camouflage. The country needs industrial peace almost as much as before V-J day, but the relaxation of public pressure, the lay-offs and cut-backs, the failure of Congress to pass any of the measures designed to cushion the shock of reconversion doomed the hope of a peaceful transition. And business seems to have made up its mind that this is the time for a showdown. To those with good memories, recent weeks have recalled the ugly period after World War I when big industry girded its surpluses for a fight to the finish with organized labor. Industry won then, at least temporarily. Today it is equally sure, equally determined. United States Steel turned down the union's proposals with an arrogance that has not been encountered since 1933. The mood of General Motors was dramatically summed up in the exchange of remarks by Vice-President Anderson of the company and Vice-President Reuther of the union during last week's negotiations. The transcript of that discussion, released by G. M., epitomizes the whole industrial conflict in America in a few angry words. Here you have capital, superior and confident, labor, angry and defiant; and yet, underlying it all a foundation of human equality that might be built upon if the deadlock could be broken. (Reuther throws Anderson's $90,000 income in his face, but when Anderson insists he has worked for it as hard as the "guys in the plants" Reuther remonstrates "Oh Harry!") President Truman's excellent fact-finding board starts hearings this week. Reuther has agreed to submit the union's full case. If G. M. is prepared to present the facts it has so far stubbornly refused to reveal, then we may get somewhere. Otherwise it looks like 1920 over again.

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AN IMPORTANT PART OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY has set Christmas back to January 1. That is the date when it will go into serious production and begin to let its products move to the storekeepers' shelves. For January 1, 1946, marks the end of the excess-profits tax; from then on industry will pay a tax of only 38 per cent of profits, instead of

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the 85½ per cent on all profits made above the pre-war tax base. That certain industries have engaged in a deliberate sit-down strike is an indisputable fact but one immensely difficult to document. Good reporters have tried it, only to find that the most elaborate and exhaustive sort of investigation is necessary to disprove the plausible but phony excuses that each plant gives for its failure to produce. But reporters, particularly those on the conservative business journals, know that there has been a manufacturers' sit-down, and so does the OPA. Most certain of all in their knowledge of the situation are the workers in the plants, who cannot be fooled on what production and delivery schedules should be. As a matter of fact, the public, too, has sufficiently convincing proof. No refrigerators, irons, radios, or miscellaneous electrical gadgets are to be bought, and supplies of textiles are below a bare minimum. Yet in all these industries, by their own confession, mechanical reconversion was no problem and took practically no time. In many cases the factories have simply held back in the hope of bludgeoning the OPA into higher price ceilings; in others because of tax considerations. When thwarted consumers grouse to dealers, they are told that the desired product is not available because of "those damned strikes." The dealers' explanation, supplied gratis by the factories in lieu of salable goods, is a correct one, except that the "strikes" aren't the kind the newspapers are talking about.

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AT THE MOMENT THE PUBLIC PRINTS ARE FULL of stories "exposing" Nancy Bruff, who wrote a "book" called "The Manatee" and used the services of Russell Birdwell, a high-powered, high-priced publicity agent, to promote its sale. "The Manatee" is apparently in a class with that other famous "book" entitled "Forever Amber," and its author is quite as glamourous. Moreover, the jacket of the book, which was published by that highly respectable firm, E. P. Dutton, is decorated with a ship's figurehead of a "bold female torso" which leaves nothing to the imagination. It's a scandal, of course, calling for public protests. But what really burns us up is the fact that all the righteous indignation, the ridicule, and even this belittling comment in *The Nation*—which did not even consider reviewing the book—will probably be pasted up in the scrapbooks of Mr. Birdwell's office as evidence of his success.

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THE PLIGHT OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IS reflected in the unanimity with which the newspapers have denounced the weasel-worded statement of policy indorsed by the Republican National Committee at Chicago. The New York *Sun* observed with classic restraint, "It is not remarkable that the statement runs to generalities." The *Herald Tribune* declared that it was "vague where it should be specific," and the independent Washington *Post* called it a "jumble of vague promises, shabby phrases, glittering generalities, and vacant viewings with alarm." A cursory reading of this remarkable document gives one the impression that its writers cribbed from the "Thesaurus" long lists of synonyms with an evil connotation to attribute to the New Deal, and assembled a parallel list of virtues which they claimed as exclusively Republican. The Chicago conference made it clear that the Old Guard is more than ever solidly in control of the Republican Party and has learned nothing from its fifteen years in the political wilderness. To judge from its strategy it has never heard of President Roosevelt's death. For the Truman Administration is denounced in exactly the same terms as was its predecessor—for its regimentation, its all-powerful bureaucracy, and, by implication, for its indorsement of alien doctrines. Instead of looking for vigorous, forward-looking leadership to challenge the pedestrian qualities of the present Democratic rule, the two Republicans most talked of at Chicago as available for 1948 were Bricker and Taft. Ex-Governor Stassen has inherited the Willkie mantle and appears to be getting even less attention than Willkie did four years ago. For those who still like to think of the Republican Party as the party of Lincoln, its present impotence must be extremely disheartening; but to those who think of it as the party of Lodge, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Dewey its condition appears the inevitable outcome of a long process of decay.

Post-Potsdam Germany

WITHIN the past few days Secretary of State Byrnes has issued an important statement formulating economic policy in regard to Germany. This document, intended for the guidance of our occupation authorities, declares that with a view to furthering the program adopted at Potsdam four immediate objectives must be pursued: (1) increased export of German coal to the liberated countries; (2) completion of the machinery necessary to execute the reparations and disarmament clauses of the Potsdam agreement, a task which involves "definition of the initial post-war German economy"; (3) organization of centralized German administrative agencies under Allied control in such fields as finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry; (4) prevention of mass starvation in Germany subject to priority for the needs of the liberated peoples.

No one can say that this program deviates from Potsdam or that it dilutes the prescription for a hard peace. On the other hand, it fails to throw any fresh light on the question of whether the Big Three's plan for Germany was in fact a practical design for a solid, permanent structure. There has always been a doubt in our mind about the compatibility of a program of de-industrialization sufficiently rigorous to insure perpetual disarmament and satisfy reparation claims and the promise that Germany would be left with the material basis for a viable economy. This doubt persists despite Mr. Byrnes's prediction that after next spring there will be a gradual recovery of German industry and exports and that by 1948, when the reparations removal program has been completed, the Germans will be within sight of the promised average European standard of living.

The Potsdam program did not go as far as the Morgenthau plan in reducing Germany to an agrarian status, but it certainly implied a very much increased dependence of the German population on their own soil both for food and employment. If that is to be accomplished in a brief term of years, it is not too soon to begin what will in any case be a very complicated adjustment, both mechanically and psychologically. The Russians in their zone have taken one impor-

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tant step by starting redistribution of the big landed estates to working farmers. But in our zone nothing, apparently, is being done to tackle this prerequisite of a new agrarian revolution, and nowhere in his statement does Mr. Byrnes so much as refer to the problem.

In view of the certainty, *pace* Mr. Morgenthau, that a swollen German population confined in a reduced area will not be able to supply itself with all necessities, any plan for Germany must allow for a volume of exports sufficient in the long run to pay for a minimum of imports. Moreover, for some years, as Mr. Byrnes recognizes, it will be necessary for the Allies to finance a considerable part of German imports. Add to the debt which will thus accumulate the occupation costs for which Germany will be liable, and it becomes clear that if it is to contrive a balance of payments in the future Germany will have to achieve a surplus of exports. For this purpose it will have available its surplus coal production, some minerals like potash, and the products of the light industries it is permitted to retain—ceramics, textiles, leather goods, toys, clocks, and so forth. But will the markets of the world be able to absorb an increased volume of such consumer goods? That is one of the many economic questions Mr. Byrnes has left unanswered.

The implementation of the Potsdam program also involves the solution of political problems, the most immediate and stubborn being that of Germany's western frontier. This, however, is a matter which Mr. Byrnes blandly dismisses with the assumption that the geographical limits of Germany will be those of the pre-Hitler Reich minus the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. This assumption is, as we pointed out last week, hotly contested by France. And even if French claims for a separate Rhine state are finally disallowed, the question of the disposition of the Ruhr will remain. Is this rich region to be wholly or partly internationalized or is it to revert eventually to Germany subject to limitations on its exploitation for armament manufacture? So long as this point remains cloudy, planning the German economy must be a hazardous business.

Exercise by the French of their veto in the Allied Control Commission is the immediate obstacle to the development of interzonal economic machinery but not the only one. If the Germans, as Mr. Byrnes suggests, are to assume "responsibility for the performance of the German economy," some kind of centralized political set-up is also necessary. There appears, however, to be no sign of preparation for the restoration of political life on a national basis. In so far as anything at all is being done to lay foundations for a new democratic structure in Germany, the job is being tackled in different ways in each of the four occupation zones.

In the American zone at the present time more and more administrative responsibility is being handed over to the local German authorities, not because of a carefully considered policy, but because haphazard redeployment has so greatly reduced effective American man-power. This development is all the more dangerous because in many sectors little has been done to revive the democratic parties, while the process of denazification is far from complete. The result, writes Raymond Daniels in the New York *Times*, "is that in some places the Nazis are becoming bolder and have begun openly bullying the rather frightened anti-Nazis."

This brings us to the problem of administration, which Saul Padover discusses on page 682. Mr. Padover believes that prolonged military occupation of Germany will be necessary but urges that the army be relieved of all administrative functions. Local government, he suggests, could then be intrusted to the Germans subject to the supervision of a special corps of American civilian officials.

We agree with Mr. Padover about the importance of civilian control but think it should be continued for a comparatively brief period. For we are skeptical about the possibility of imposing reeducation on Germany by foreign rule. Our own inclination would be to limit the occupation of Germany to the period necessary for carrying out the disarmament and reparations program. Meanwhile, to prepare the way for a responsible German government, we should give positive encouragement to the democratic forces while taking steps to destroy the economic base of the reactionaries by confiscating their lands and industrial holdings. This would do more to safeguard the world against future German aggressions than de-industrialization on a scale that threatens to reduce Germany to an economic slum dependent on international charity.

Men in the Street

WITH one million families now living doubled up, and veterans mustered out at the rate of 10,000 a day hunting desperately for homes, President Truman's promise of action on housing comes none too soon. The program he outlined last week calls for the immediate release of government surplus housing and materials, priorities for lower-priced dwellings, and legislative price ceilings on both new and old houses offered for sale. Since the third point must await Congressional action, an early improvement in the situation depends very much on the effectiveness of the revived priorities system. The President proposes to channel 50 per cent of all building materials into the construction of housing units costing $10,000 or less. That is a step in the right direction, but is it a big enough step?

In the present situation, when the demand for houses is out of all proportion to the supply, it is very difficult to prevent a maximum price from becoming a minimum. Thus there is real danger that most new houses will be built to sell very near the limit. According to the realtor's simple rule of thumb, a $10,000 unit rents for about $100 a month. But only 4 per cent of American families can pay $75 or more a month, and it is estimated that only 6 per cent of the veterans can afford to pay more than $50 a month for a home. In other words, in order to stimulate the supply of housing in accordance with *needs* a much lower ceiling should have been set.

Another objection to the encouragement of $10,000 houses is the fact that such units absorb additional quantities of critical materials and equipment. A house with two bathrooms provides shelter for only one family, but it deprives the builder of equipment essential for lower-priced

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units which could give homes to two families. Moreover, in the absence of any control over profit margins except that provided by the Federal Housing Authority's valuation system, there is a standing temptation to builders to add gadgets to justify a higher price while skimping on solid construction. Thus the President's new plan provides no guaranty against the diversion of most new housing to a tiny minority of the population, leaving the veterans to be accommodated in abandoned army camps, trailers, and collapsible war housing.

There is, however, pending before the House Banking and Currency Committee a bill introduced by Representative Patman which not only includes power to allocate scarce materials for low-cost housing but provides for price ceilings on all new construction and authority to check speculation in existing houses. "Such authority," wrote John W. Snyder in the memorandum on housing on which the President's action was based, "is essential if we are to avert further skyrocketing of home prices." The bill declares that ceiling prices on new construction should be determined on the basis of actual cost plus the prevailing contractor's margin for similar buildings in 1941. An important feature of the measure is that it would permit some flexibility of action enabling the government to vary its formula for different areas, relaxing or tightening controls in accordance with local needs. The bill has the whole-hearted support of Chester Bowles, chief of the Office of Price Administration, who sees in it a valuable new weapon in the fight against inflation which he is waging so stoutly.

By approving Mr. Snyder's memorandum the President has inferentially given his blessing to this bill. But the building industry and real-estate lobbies have been carrying on a strenuous campaign against it, and if it is ever to emerge from committee there will have to be much more forceful pressure from the public.

One step by the President which may conceivably help to organize public opinion behind this and similar measures to meet the housing crisis is the appointment of Wilson Wyatt as Housing Expeditor. As the war-time mayor of Louisville, Kentucky, Mr. Wyatt demonstrated ability to plan for the future and rare courage and independence as an administrator. Moreover, he made a point of going to the people—Negro as well as white—for direct approval of his ideas for a better community. Mr. Wyatt's municipal experience is an important qualification for his new job, since building is a peculiarly local trade and its problems must frequently be tackled locally in cooperation with contractors, realtors, municipal authorities, and tenants' organizations.

In seeking to remove the many bottlenecks in the housing industry Mr. Wyatt will have to work within existing legislation, which is clearly inadequate, and get along without too much backing from his immediate boss, Mr. Snyder, whose past record has been one of vacillation and retreat. But if Mr. Wyatt will take a leaf from the book of Mr. Bowles and explain clearly to the public what his problems are and what action is needed to overcome them, he has a chance to rally a volume of opinion which will smother the speculative interests. For housing is one issue which can be taken to the man who is, literally, in the street.

The Army Way

A THREE-LAYER cake with alternate good and bad layers is the best description of American policy in Japan. The top layer has the acrid taste of World War III because, despite the decorative icing provided by the Far Eastern Advisory Committee, our unilateral role in Japan is primarily a reflection of the anti-Soviet prejudices which dominate certain government circles in Washington. The second layer—made up of detailed Washington-born directives—has the surprisingly fresh flavor of enlightened democratic thinking. It reveals the fundamental change in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs since the departure of Joseph Clark Grew and the ascendancy of John Carter Vincent. The recent announcement classifying Prince Konoye and some sixty other top non-military oligarchs as war criminals is not only a laudable step, long overdue, but also a measure of the effect of Mr. Grew's departure. Mr. Grew had a genuine liking for the Prince, and some of his closest advisers were actually booming Konoye for the job of post-war Premier. In the face of a good deal of pressure from Japanese conservatives, we have stuck to our promises on freedom of speech and refused their demand that we exclude the Japanese Communists from the air. We have also forced through legislation designed to uproot the semi-feudal system of land-tenure, and we have ended government sponsorship of State Shintoism, inspirer of fanatical jingoism. The Japanese people will further profit by our insistence that their government plan for their relief during the hard months coming.

The third layer of policy—carrying out these enlightened directives—has the familiar stale taste of army expediency. General MacArthur, apparently feeling that his future political hopes hang on the character of the job he does in Japan, is moving energetically to carry out his objectives. But the American army is not a suitable instrument for an intricate job of social engineering and, although it complains of a shortage of skilled personnel, has refused to utilize the talents of some of the State Department men on the spot. As a result, the State Department advisers under George Atcheson, Jr., among whom are several exceptionally qualified men, can exercise influence on MacArthur only by making recommendations to the department, which passes them on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who may eventually forward them to General MacArthur back in Tokyo.

Army administration in Japan is further bedeviled by its obstinate refusal to realize how hopeless is the attempt to achieve the democratic reforms to which we are pledged through the present reactionary Japanese regime. Employing a Mitsubishi man like Premier Shidehara as the leading figure in a program pledged to the elimination of big business is tantamount to asking Representative Rankin to head a tolerance campaign. Konoye's cheating of the war guilt trial through suicide shows the danger of special courtesies to upper-crust war criminals. But in spite of exclusiveness, inconsistency, and inadequate execution, the overall impact of American policy upon Japan has been rather good. We have loosened the political strait-jacket and furthered progressive social objectives, and next month Japan will have the most nearly democratic election in its history.

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Another Inquiry Begins

BY I. F. STONE

THERE is much that is good to be said of President Truman's appointments to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. The American chairman, United States Circuit Court Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson of Houston, Texas, is best known for his decision in the Strecker case. Judge Hutcheson described the attempt to deny Strecker citizenship because of past membership in the Communist Party as "a kind of Pecksniffian righteousness, savoring strongly of hypocrisy and party bigotry." A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with him. Earlier, as a federal district judge, Hutcheson wrote a decision in the Osterloh case which widened the rights of aliens in deportation proceedings. Judge Hutcheson brings a free mind and a sympathetic spirit to the work of the committee.

Of the five men named with Judge Hutcheson, one has devoted a large part of his life to the refugee problem. James G. McDonald was made High Commissioner for German Refugees by the League of Nations in October, 1933. Two years later he resigned in protest against the League's half-hearted attitude. In one capacity or another he has been engaged ever since in trying to help the victims of Hitlerism. No one knows better the elaborate ritual of investigation, conference, and intergovernmental committee with which the Western powers have been accustomed to approach—and evade—the questions involved in this new inquiry.

The four other American members of the committee have had no direct contact with the problems of European Jewry or of Palestine, but there is no reason to believe any of them unfriendly. Former Under Secretary of State William Phillips, once Ambassador to Rome under Mussolini, is a professional diplomat, a type which in the United States tends to be assimilated to the British point of view. But as Roosevelt's special representative to India during the war, Phillips demonstrated an independence that soon made him persona non grata with the Churchill government. Though his mission was to explore the possibilities of compromise with the Indian Nationalist movement, Phillips was denied access to Gandhi and Nehru. His report to the White House was critical of British imperial policy. That background may prove useful in the Middle East.

There is less to be reported about the remaining three committee members. O. Max Gardner, now practicing law in Washington, made a good record as Governor of North Carolina and is well regarded by Southern progressives. Frank W. Buxton is the respected veteran editor of the Boston *Herald*. He won a Pulitzer prize back in 1924 for an editorial called Who Made Calvin Coolidge? The editorial, reread today, inevitably has a kind of Currier and Ives flavor. It is unnecessary to produce credentials for Frank Aydelotte, director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. He is American secretary of the Rhodes Trust and a good friend of Britain—but one need not be an enemy of Britain to dislike the White Paper or distrust Ernest Bevin.

Of the six British members of the joint commission, the one known to us at *The Nation*—if only as his occasional, though admiring, readers—is R. H. S. Crossman, assistant editor of the London *New Statesman and Nation*. About the others the only facts available are biographical details supplied by the British Ministry of Information. Lord Morrison of Tottenham is one of the New Labor peers, an old-timer in the party, once parliamentary secretary to Ramsay MacDonald. Sir Frederick William Leggett has been in the Ministry of Labor since 1917. Major Reginald Edward Manningham-Buller is a barrister and a Conservative M. P. Wilfred P. Crick is economic adviser to the Midland Bank, one of the so-called Big Four banks. Sir John Edward Singleton, chairman of the British contingent, has been a judge of the King's Bench since 1934. It is not an exciting list.

These are, I am sure, good men, and I intend no disrespect to them when I say that it is difficult to write of the new inquiry temperately. Such inquiries, to judge from past experience, represent a kind of "heads I win, tails you lose" gamble. If the commission finds that surviving European Jews are begging for a chance to stay in Germany and Poland, and only a handful of Zionists want to go to Palestine, we may be sure the findings will be fully and immediately "implemented." But if the commission finds that most of the survivors wants to go to Palestine and should be permitted to go there, we may be equally sure that the recommendations will bog down. This process is well understood in Palestine.

I spent an evening, in Haifa, with one of the leaders of the current civil-disobedience campaign against the British authorities. I began by trying to convince him that it might be wise to do nothing until the committee had brought in its report. He ended by convincing me that the Jews of Palestine are justified in feeling that they cannot wait. Before the war, during the war, and now again since the war, they have seen a series of inquiries and conferences. There was one at Evian. There was another at Bermuda. Nothing came of them. As the number of inquiries grew, the number of Jews declined. Many Palestinian Jews feel—and I fully share that feeling—that a kind of "non-intervention" was practiced by the Western powers against European Jewry. "Six million Jews died in Europe while we waited for the democratic powers to act," said one Palestinian. "Thousands more of the remnants will die if we sit here with hands folded during the winter while they investigate again." The Palestinians, who did such quietly heroic work rescuing their brethren from Axis Europe, are going on with the job of rescuing them from "liberated" Europe—despite the White Paper.

In London I found the atmosphere as complacent as that in Palestine was desperate. The problem in London is just another of those headaches of empire. In Palestine half the Jews are folk who got away barely in time to escape Belsen

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and Oswiecim; the dead were their kinsfolk; the survivors are their kinsfolk, too, the last of whole families. I spoke with Jewish boys in British army uniform who had found friends and relatives in the camps. "More than food or clothing these people need hope—the hope of having a home at last." The British are a kind people, but they have troubles of their own. In Palestine the Jews are building a nation, and the plight of European Jewry is not merely sentimental or peripheral but as intense and central a matter as the massacre of Britons and the succor of the survivors would be for Englishmen. For Palestinians illegal immigration is a Jewish Dunkirk across the Mediterranean, an urgent and inescapable duty.

There are sympathetic folk in England who express the opinion that Bevin proposed the commission of inquiry as a means of giving him a way out with the Arabs. They point to the possibility of interim reports by subcommittees as a wedge to open Palestine's doors to increased immigration. It is difficult to reconcile this theory with the news from Germany that Field Marshal Montgomery has ordered new refugees from anti-Semitic Poland turned back at the border of the British zone lest they "aggravate" the Palestine problem. It is hard to reconcile any optimistic theory with the British Labor government's foreign policy elsewhere, from Greece to Java, where Bekasi seems to have provided a fair imitation of Lidice. My own opinion is that Bevin wanted the inquiry in order to get America to share, not the responsibility for a genuinely equitable solution in the Middle East, but the odium of shutting off Palestine to further Jewish immigration. Bevin's concern is not a decent break for the surviving Jews of Europe but the building of an anti-Soviet bloc in the Middle East at the expense of Jewish aspirations for a refuge and a national home.

The Future Role of Britain

BY AYLMER VALLANCE

*(*The Nation's *London correspondent)*

London, December 7

ALL the uncertainties in today's picture of Britain—its future standard of living, its progress, swift or halting, toward real socialism, its wisdom in borrowing dollars—center in one question which neither the people of this country nor the Labor government has yet had the mental toughness to face. Is Britain to attempt in the atomic age, with the world divided geopolitically between the two land masses of America and Russia, to play the part of a great power, with all that that implies in diversion of resources to armaments and in dependence on economic aid, on terms, from the United States? Or is it to cut its coat according to its modest cloth and accept, as its future destiny, the role of "middle" power, leading the smaller nations of Western Europe in a "neutrality bloc" and resolutely declining, in foreign and imperial policy, to assume responsibilities or pursue objectives that are incommensurate with its own strength?

That question might well have been debated when the all-embracing motion of censure was offered by the Tory opposition in Parliament this week. In fact, the issue was burked on both sides: the government is not ready with its answer, and the Tories, with their sentimental heritage of nineteenth-century imperialist patriotism, will never get round to thinking realistically about such fundamentals. The result is that in contemporary British politics there is an air of unreality, of shadow-boxing, while events take shape by default. But as your correspondent's duty is to chronicle what is actually happening in the British political arena and not to present merely an existentialist picture of what is *not* happening, he must interpose here a brief summary of the past month's developments. They have been twofold: the opposition has declared total war, and there has been a significant "tightening of the ranks" behind the government.

At the beginning of this parliamentary session it looked as if the Tories were inclined to concede that the electorate had given Labor a clear mandate for a big instalment of state planning and intervention in the national economy, and as if they would confine themselves to constructive, semi-benevolent criticism of individual measures. Mr. Churchill, indeed, promised to refrain from opposing nationalization schemes which did not involve "questions of principle"; this Parliament, he hoped, would be "fruitful." Gone is that attitude.

Though many of the big industrialists, like Sir Clive Baillieu, president of the Federation of British Industries, have publicly declared their readiness to accept the framework of over-all state planning and to cooperate with the government in a policy of full employment, provided reasonable scope for private initiative is left in non-nationalized industries, the Tory line is now an all-out anti-Socialist crusade. One or two of the more liberal-minded Conservative front benchers, such as Harold Macmillan, are probably unhappy about this policy. They can hardly fail to be aware of its incongruity with the fact that a committee appointed by Mr. Churchill's administration, and presided over by the chairman of Unilever, Ltd., has just recommended unanimously the transfer to public ownership of the gas industry —on rational grounds of promoting more efficient organization. This handful of "progressive" Tories would really like to follow the Liberal Party's line and try to discover a way of dovetailing smoothly the working of private and state enterprise in their respective fields. But this "compromising" policy has been vetoed by the Tory party managers, and Winston Churchill recently proclaimed the end of non-belligerency.

In their new attitude the Tories make no appeal to reason. Their slogan is, "The People Versus Socialist Tyranny." Are

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there shortages? Blame Cripps; he is deliberately imposing austerity for doctrinaire ends. Is reconversion going slow? Blame the Socialists' passion for bureaucratic red tape. Are pockets of unemployment already visible? The government is robbing you of your job in order to prove that capitalism can't work. Do you lack a house, a Christmas turkey, a sense of "Happy Days Are Here Again"? Then you ought not to have listened to Labor blandishments; the old Tory firm would have delivered the goods; the land would have flowed with milk and honey. These were the implications behind every Tory speech in the censure debate; and even Mr. Churchill's rhetorical invective could not disguise the weakness of the opposition's position.

Coming from a party which has no intelligible positive policy for reconstruction and whose only plan is to have no planning, the Tories' attack on the government's "incompetence" cuts little ice with the majority of the public. With the aid of a predominantly Conservative press every sort of irrational discontent—at rationing, queues, form-filling, and so forth—can doubtless be exploited. Parliamentary time can be wasted in motions of censure and endless, factious amendments to bills. Schemes of nationalization can be held up by inordinate demands—now being made by the coal owners—for compensation. Some employers can be persuaded to "go slow" with production: this is happening now in the motor industry. If there were really large-scale unemployment, there might be an audience for the Tories—or even for the fascist "Christian Reformers," who proclaim the deity of Hitler, and for Blackshirt Mosley, now launching a publishing venture. But, for the moment, it would take more than these ranting Tory tactics seriously to embarrass the government; and when Tory headquarters tries to discredit Labor's behavior by calling for recruits to form bodyguards for speakers "liable to receive rough treatment," the average voter just laughs.

In Parliament the natural reaction of Labor members would in any case have been to rally behind their leaders. During the censure debate they plunged with gusto into the fray. But apart from this the morale of the party, slightly deflated, as your correspondent has previously reported, by doubts whether the Cabinet would have the courage to move on from the uncomfortable halfway house of "negative" state control to more positive Socialist action, had been greatly stiffened by Aneurin Bevan; and in the hitherto depressing background of foreign policy Ernest Bevin's last speech had raised hopes of a saner approach to fundamental problems. In his Building Materials bill the Minister of Health gave the first clear indication that if capitalist enterprise is no longer ready or able to provide the initiative for production on the state's terms, the state will assume the responsibility. Not merely will the Ministry, at need, undertake building by labor squads in its direct employ; it is going in for manufacture of housing components by state-owned factories in a big way, and is planning to make the wholesale distribution of all building materials and fittings a state monopoly if it has any trouble with price rings. This was the forthright stuff that Labor back benchers, impatient at apparent hesitations, wanted to hear.

As for Mr. Bevin, the party has been disappointed with the meager results of Mr. Attlee's American visit: the Study Commission on Atomic Control was generally regarded as an unpromising effort to find a way out of the vicious circle created by American reluctance to abandon, until conditions of confidence had been established, an aggressive weapon whose monopoly by one nation made realization of those conditions, in a world of uncompromisingly sovereign states, impossible. A more imaginative lead from Mr. Attlee had been hoped for; and in his speech last month Mr. Bevin seemed to give it. He came out boldly for the pooling of sovereignty in a world government: if real security was to be achieved, federalism it must be, and nothing less. Not ignoring the obstacles—in Moscow no less than in Washington—the Labor back benchers cheered lustily; here, at least, were signs of a real breaking away from Churchillian imperialism.

How real is it? Here we come to the crucial question with which this dispatch began. The one irremediable mistake which this country could make would be to follow the fatal example of France in the 1920's and to maintain the foreign policy and armaments of a great power when it cannot afford to do so. A simple sum in terms of man-power is conclusive. In 1939, with 500,000 men in the armed forces and 1,500,000 unemployed, Britain had a labor force of 3,000,000 available for the manufacture of consumers' goods. The total post-war labor force will be no larger than in 1939, and the numbers needed in the production of food, coal, houses, and capital goods and in distribution and other services will not be smaller. Assume 500,000 fewer unemployed: it will still be impossible to have armed forces exceeding 750,000 men, without crippling the output of consumers' goods, of which a proportion much greater than in the inter-war years must be allocated to exports. So far the government talks as if it contemplated having over 2,000,000 men more or less indefinitely in the services. This would kill all hopes of securing a reasonable standard of living in this country; socialism would stand condemned as the architect of penury.

We must, then, lighten our commitments, and this means modeling our foreign policy not on yours or Russia's but rather on that of Switzerland or Sweden. If one could be sure that Mr. Bevin and his colleagues accepted realistically Britain's enforced future status as the biggest of the minor powers, one would feel less disquiet about the implications of Britain's dollar borrowing.

Irrespective of political parties, the greater part of informed British opinion regards the terms of the dollar loan with grave disquiet, which is likely to increase as the full implications of the complicated provisions are appreciated. The immediate advantages from our standpoint are obvious. First, we shall avoid a hard period of still more drastic rationing of consumption goods, which the government's enemies would have exploited politically. Secondly, and more importantly, we shall have an opportunity to make speedier economic recovery by ampler immediate imports of raw materials and reequipment plant. These gains, however, are outweighed by a formidable list of disadvantages.

In the first place, though Britain retains the right to maintain quantitative import restrictions, it is pledged to make no discrimination between countries. That is, it forfeits the ability to switch its purchases—for example, of petroleum—

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to the sterling area and may be compelled even to contract its trade with the dominions if a shortage of dollars compels it to restrict imports from the United States. Secondly, there is extreme uncertainty whether we can actually honor the commitments assumed. Britain's balance of current external payments is estimated to show a deficit of five billion dollars in the next three years, thus absorbing more than the dollar credit line now opened. Furthermore, even assuming that the blocked sterling balances are partly liquidated by use of the existing dollar resources in the sterling pool and partly scaled down and funded, nevertheless, liabilities to sterling creditors will still be an immense future strain on our balance of payments. Considering that Britain's obligation to terminate, by the end of 1946, the whole existing sterling-area mechanism means giving a free run in the Empire to an intensive American export drive, can Britain rely on achieving, by 1951, an export surplus sufficient either to meet interest and amortization on the dollar loan or to enable us to implement the "free-exchange" obligations of Bretton Woods? The answer is yes, provided a miracle occurs.

That miracle would be the willingness of Congress, in the scheduled International Trade Conference, to authorize your Administration to make big tariff concessions without reciprocal gains from others, thus creating a real probability of a permanent American import surplus. Unless that eventuates, and the United States also successfully maintains high stable employment, it is considered here inevitable that Britain will be faced after 1951 with a dollar shortage necessitating, first, invocation of the interest-waiver clauses in the loan terms; second, invocation of the "scarce-currency" escape clauses in Bretton Woods; and third, in all probability, Britain's resignation from the Monetary Fund. For Britain, therefore, acceptance of the loan terms represents a gigantic gamble dependent on an unknown factor—your willingness to pursue a liberal trade policy and accept the "good-neighbor" obligations of your creditor position. If the gamble fails, Great Britain will be in the unpleasant situation of an insolvent debtor who has seriously weakened his own economic independence.

A final doubt is whether the present agreement will ultimately preserve good Anglo-American relations. Parliament will doubtless ratify the agreement next week; but it will do so believing we have really secured five years' interest-free prolongation of Lend-Lease aid, repayable only if America creates conditions making repayment feasible. If Congress fails to make radical changes in American trade policy, then Britain can sidestep both Bretton Woods and the loan repayment, declaring that Congress is solely blameworthy for a

BOTH (MENACINGLY) "TELL YOUR FUTURE, DEARIE ?"

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horse-trading deal which took insufficient account of Britain's war sacrifices. If this be the upshot, Congress will naturally indict British trickery. In view of the probability of this deplorable result, it is felt here that it would have been wiser for Britain, at the cost of immediate hardships, to forgo a loan on terms so pregnant with future disagreements.

There is no occasion for Socialists here to wring their hands or cry, "All is lost." Neither the loan terms nor the provisions of Bretton Woods preclude the British government from maintaining the minimum controls essential to a planned Socialist economy; and whatever Congress may be led to suppose, there is no question of our surrendering on these fundamental principles. Nor would it be a constructive attitude to await passively the breakdown which is foreseen for 1951. What we must do, so far as our relations with the United States are concerned, is to go forward to the International Trade Conference with a program aiming at an expansionist commercial policy based on full employment, and hope for the best. But in matters within our own control we are more than ever bound to husband our resources and develop them for civilian production. The one thing we cannot afford to do is to use your dollar facilities as a means of maintaining grandiose armaments in support of a Palmerstonian foreign policy. We must lighten our liabilities in India and the Middle East; we must seek friendships in Europe both with our near neighbors and with countries in the Russian sphere. We must exercise influence, not by armed strength, but by unaggressive leadership of states which have renounced power politics. Otherwise our borrowing will mean not only the loss of our independence but economic and moral ruin.

A Plan for Germany

BY SAUL K. PADOVER

(Historian and political scientist; during the war a member of the army's Psychological Warfare Division)

WHETHER as a result of criticism or in recognition of its own limitations, the army has apparently decided that government of Germany by the military should be discontinued. Some weeks ago Major General John H. Hilldring, head of the Military Government (Civil Affairs) Division, quietly announced the policy that "civilians, directed by civilian agencies of our government, should take over."

This decision will be applauded by all who have been properly critical of Military Government. But where does it leave us? It is easy for the army to say to civilians, You take over. The fact is, there is nobody to take over. We have so bungled our planning for Germany that we have no civilian personnel trained to administer the American zone. So far as I know, no governmental civilian agency exists to which the responsibility for ruling Germany can be transferred.

I do not know what the time-limit for improvising and guessing is, but I do know that the Administration in Washington cannot continue such a course much longer without running into serious trouble. It must make up its mind what to do with the Germans and then it must act decisively. Clear thinking on the subject can be aided by the recognition of certain paradoxes: first, that Military Government in Germany is not desirable, but that a military occupation is necessary; second, that the Germans should be allowed local self-government, but that major decisions should not be left in their hands.

If we continue to maintain a large occupation force in Germany, a time will come—possibly as soon as the next Presidential election—when the crypto-fascists and neo-isolationists will start a campaign against wasting the taxpayers' money by keeping soldiers in a disarmed country. Such a campaign would probably have the support of pacifist and pro-German elements. But should our armed forces really pull entirely out of Germany, the whole European balance would be upset and the dormant Nazi elements encouraged to come out of hiding. Moreover, Great Britain and France would be confounded.

To avoid this possibility, we should keep in Germany a permanent small force consisting of a number of fixed garrisons and a compact air force disposed at strategic points. A number of army posts could be transferred bodily from the United States to the American zone to act as garrisons. Members of the regular army could be sent to these posts for training, being rotated every three months. A man can get his military training as effectively in Kassel as in Kansas, and with little additional cost to the taxpayers. These regular army garrisons in Germany would have the duty of protecting our interests, but would do no governing.

The local government of Germany should be intrusted to German officials, but always under the supervision of American civilians. It is important to recognize the bleak truth that most Germans today are without experience in self-government, that they have few political interests or desires, and that it may take decades to overcome their civic inertia.

We must also keep in mind that the present generation of Germans is not promising material for a democracy, although there are exceptions among the older people. To leave any great responsibility, without proper guidance, in their hands would, I am convinced, lead to a new dictatorship. I recall talking one day in the Ruhr to a large group of workers, many of them former Social Democrats, and asking them about their political ideas for the future. They replied with one voice: *"Wir müssen den richtigen Mann finden"* ("We must find the right man").

German youth presents a special problem. Roughly speaking, boys and girls under sixteen or seventeen are probably redeemable; those over that age are poisoned perhaps beyond recovery. The Edelweiss Society, which organized the only "revolt" against the Nazis that took place under Hitler, consisted largely of young kids who were disgusted with the compulsions of Nazism. There were thousands of them,

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principally in the Catholic regions. These youngsters had no positive political ideas; they were simply against regimentation and against the deprivations they were undergoing. Properly directed, such young people could be turned into decent democratic citizens.

The question is: Who can do it? The great majority of the teachers cannot be trusted. Most of those who are not Nazis are ultra-nationalists and pan-Germans. In one German city we went through a list of 328 grammar-school teachers, and after making all due allowances we were left with only 18 who were not Nazis or extreme reactionaries. Hitler had set up a large number of normal schools *(Lehrer und Lehrerinen Bildungs-Anstalten)* to train teachers in the Nazi spirit—a fact not generally known. Students were recruited from families which the Nazis considered reliable, and the underlying philosophy of the curriculum was *Rassenkunde*. Hitler had personally given the order, a superintendent of schools in a big German city told me, that "no German child should leave school without a thorough orientation in racial science."

The first crop of these Nazi-trained teachers took over around 1942. Today all the younger teachers are probably Nazi, not nominally but in spirit. It would be wise not to employ any of them. This means that we should either have to close the schools for a time—in the Ruhr many schools have been closed since 1943—or employ right-thinking but ill-trained non-professional pedagogues. Possibly some of the refugees in this country and in England might be persuaded to return to Germany as teachers and trainers of teachers; or German-speaking Swiss might be induced to undertake a teacher-training program. Education in the long run is a more important problem than the dismantling of German industry. The army is not equipped to solve it. And obviously the Germans themselves, even democratic Germans, cannot be expected to carry through the pedagogic revolution that is called for. We should not repeat the mistake of the democratic Weimar Republic in leaving the reactionary, militaristic, monarchist teachers unmolested.

Whatever steps we take to solve this particular problem, we must follow a democratic line and, if necessary, follow it without regard to policy in the other zones. It is unfortunate that the division of Germany into four zones makes a unified educational, as well as political and economic, policy difficult if not impossible. But within the limits of the Potsdam agreement the United States can carry on experiments. If these experiments should be successful, they might be adopted by the British and French and perhaps also by the Russians. In any case, the United States is in a position to influence, if not the whole German nation, at least one-fourth of it.

I believe that the President, with the consent of Congress, should set up an Occupied Lands Authority as a permanent agency. The OLA should consist of those members of the Cabinet who have a direct interest in foreign areas—the Secretaries of State, War, the Treasury, and perhaps others. The first step of the OLA might well be to organize a Foreign Civil Service Division, the second to set up training schools. The army had such schools at Charlottesville and elsewhere, and so did the OWI and the OSS for different purposes. The experience of these schools is available, as is probably much of the personnel. The OWI and the OSS at one time or another employed our ablest specialists on foreign countries, and the OLA might do some useful recruiting among their former members. A civil service for Germany, and probably for Japan too, would require psychiatrists, educators, editors, writers, economists, sociologists, jurists, political scientists, and police administrators. It would not need engineers or firemen or public-utilities experts; there are plenty of Germans trained in those fields.

In place of the Military Government officers, the President, through the OLA, would appoint civilian high commissioners for each of the German provinces under our jurisdiction. Each high commissioner would be, so to speak, a viceroy and would have veto power over the German Minister-President. A similar scheme could be worked out for the bigger cities: every Bürgermeister would have an American civilian commissioner over him.

It would be imperative that all the commissioners should be men of the highest caliber with experience in democratic administration. I can think of a number of such individuals—for example, Harold Stassen, Milton Eisenhower, Herbert Lehman; I am merely suggesting the type, not offering recommendations. For the sake of the object lesson, one of the high commissioners might well be a Negro. The high commissioners and commissioners need not know German, but their staff of specialists should speak the language. The specialists would not occupy administrative posts but would serve solely in the capacity of friends and advisers to the German officials. I believe that the American staff would be most effective if it did not interfere too much but let the qualified German administrators take responsibility. Obviously only democratic and anti-Nazi Germans should be intrusted with power, and they should be given considerable freedom of action.

Another consideration: power, as the saying goes, has a tendency to corrupt. To guard the American occupation officials from temptation and to protect the Germans against the Americans, constitutional safeguards should be set up. We should proclaim in our zone a charter of basic rights—including the right to speak and write freely (within the limits of military security), the right of habeas corpus, and the right to trial by jury. After all, the way to teach democracy is to practice it.

Any planning for a Foreign Civil Service must also consider certain imponderables. Americans can be terribly lonely in Germany and to escape the depressing monotony may be driven to liquor and—"fraternization." It would therefore be desirable to permit wives to accompany their husbands. I think, too, that the American civil officials should wear a semi-military uniform. In Germany a uniform commands respect, and a democratic civil service would find its work greatly facilitated if its members wore good-looking and somewhat ceremonial attire.

But however wise our policies and however skilled our personnel, a certain amount of trouble must be expected. I am convinced that a fascist-nationalist underground is inevitable in Germany. For one thing, historical experience tells us that an occupying authority inevitably arouses opposition. For another, unemployment is bound to cause discontent and unrest. In fact, the amount of opposition to the occu-

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pation will probably be determined by the economic situation. Again and again Germans, especially workers, said to me that all they wanted from the Americans was *"Brot und Arbeit"* ("Bread and Work"). Without employment—on one level or another—any democratic experiment will probably fail. Too many Germans still have painful memories of the hard times that persisted under the Weimar Republic. Not to solve this problem now would be to link the concepts "unemployment" and "democracy" permanently in the German mind. Hitler's greatest claim to loyalty and support from the German masses was his success in creating work for all.

Creation of employment under present conditions will undoubtedly require a fundamental shift of the population from the cities to the villages. Last spring German farmers complained bitterly to us that they had no labor to help them, particularly after the Polish and Russian slave workers left. There has always been a shortage of farm labor in the Reich, and it has been made more severe by the war casualties. German city workers do not like farm labor, but they will have no choice. The light industries that are permitted to continue will certainly not be sufficient to absorb the industrial workers. For the next generation or so the German people will be able to support life only if they are largely de-industrialized. This, in my opinion, is not a matter of anybody's wish—it is simply the legacy left by Hitler.

By long-range planning we can, I believe, rule Germany with a small corps of American civilians, reeducate German youth, and prepare the German people for ultimate incorporation in a society of free nations. With a few fixed military garrisons we can meet our international obligations and secure European stability. Not the least advantage of the plan I have proposed is its inexpensiveness. A small staff of civilian specialists trained to govern Germany would cost no more than the construction and maintenance of a battleship.

[*This is the fifth and last of a series of articles on the Military Government of Germany.*]

Who Owns a College?

BY CAREY McWILLIAMS

(Contributing editor of The Nation*)*

Chicago, December 5

ROOSEVELT COLLEGE of Chicago was formally dedicated on November 16, when Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt affixed a bronze plaque bearing the inscription "Dedicated to the Enlightenment of the Human Spirit" to what will some day be the cornerstone of an institution of learning named after the late President. The story of Roosevelt College concerns all persons interested in education, for it raises the pertinent question: Who really owns a college?

For the beginning of that story we have to go back to 1936, when Dr. Edward J. Sparling, who had recently become president of Central Y. M. C. A. College in Chicago, made an interesting discovery. Central College was one of some twenty colleges maintained by the Y. M. C. A. in Chicago and directed by the board of the local "Y" in cooperation with the central board. Dr. Sparling found that Negro students were required to pay an annual physical-education fee but were not allowed to use the swimming pool, gymnasium, or other athletic facilities of the local "Y." As soon as he learned of the discrimination, he ordered gymnasium fees refunded to all Negro students and then discontinued the athletic program of the college until such time as the local Y. M. C. A. was prepared to allow Central College students to use its facilities without regard to race or color. At a later date Dr. Sparling learned that the Edgewater Beach Hotel, where the college graduation ceremonies were scheduled to be held, followed a Jim Crow policy, and he canceled the arrangements. Then in 1944 the college sponsored the publication of a booklet written by Dr. Gordon Allport on the subject of scapegoats. These actions, while not particularly revolutionary, seem to have aroused considerable anxiety among the highly conservative members of the board of directors.

In August, 1944, Mayor Kelly called a conference on race relations in Chicago. Dr. Sparling, who was one of the speakers, condemned restrictive covenants as "un-Christian, undemocratic, and un-American." At the same conference, however, Newton C. Farr, a member of Dr. Sparling's board of directors, upheld the morality of such restrictions and their social "justification." A millionaire real-estate operator, Mr. Farr is known to Chicago Negroes as "the man who tightened the Black Belt." He is a former president of the National Real Estate Association, a member of the board of Lincoln Memorial University and the Illinois Institute of Technology, a trustee of the Edith Rockefeller-McCormick trust, a vice-president of the Chicago Title and Trust Company, and extremely active in the Oakland-Kenwood Property Owners' Association, which is credited by Chicago Negroes with having established the prevailing pattern of restrictions in Chicago. Oddly enough, Mr. Farr is a devoted admirer of Abraham Lincoln and has long been a member of the Civil War Round Table Club of Chicago, which meets to discuss rare items of Lincolniana and the Civil War. The owner of a large library of volumes about Lincoln and the Civil War, Mr. Farr considers himself quite an authority on the Reconstruction period. "Gone with the Wind," he believes, is a "nearly factual" description of Reconstruction, while Howard Fast's "Freedom Road" is of "doubtful authenticity."

For an admirer of Lincoln Mr. Farr holds some extraordinary views about Negroes and Jews. In an extremely frank interview with Richard Durham of the Chicago *Defender*, printed on February 17, 1945, Mr. Farr said, "Negroes enjoy sex too much. They are inclined to be promiscuous. They are mostly uneducated, and the majority of them are poor, ragged, and dirty. They're underfed. They make undesirable neighbors." And he was certain that Abraham Lincoln, if

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he were alive today, would indorse the idea of restrictive regulations. "If restrictive covenants were dropped today," said Mr. Farr, "and if a thousand Negroes moved into Hyde Park or Oak Park, there would be war. There'd be hell to pay." His prejudices, unlike his covenants, are not restricted to Negroes. "Take Jews," he declared in the same interview. "As a race they too have certain undesirable characteristics. Especially the poorer Jews. They're gluttons. They eat too much. They get fat, sloppy."

After Mayor Kelly's conference on race relations Mr. Farr expressed a desire for a private "heart-to-heart" talk with Dr. Sparling about restrictive covenants. When the meeting took place, Mr. Farr insisted that "Negroes enjoy more brotherhood among themselves" than they would enjoy if they were permitted to associate freely with whites. Dr. Sparling disputed this. Mr. Farr spoke with enthusiasm on his private project, the George Washington Carver Homes, an all-Negro project in the Negro section, calling it the type of building which might bring about a solution of the acute Negro housing problem in Chicago. Questioned by Dr. Sparling, he admitted that although the units were not completed he already had 1,000 Negro applicants for the 54 apartments in the project. Needless to say, this conversation did not bring about a reconciliation between the president of Central College and its most influential director.

At a meeting of the board in November, 1944, Mr. Farr asked Dr. Sparling how many Negro and Jewish students were enrolled at the college. Dr. Sparling replied that he did not know, since under his administration no records of this sort were kept. Other members of the board joined Mr. Farr in insisting that the information be supplied. "The board of directors," they said, "is running this college." Dr. Sparling finally agreed to obtain the facts but said that if the information were used to establish a quota system, he would feel compelled to resign the presidency. The figures showed that under his administration the enrolment of Negroes had increased from 4 per cent of the student body to 25 per cent. In some departments—for example, in the classes in stenography—Negroes were more heavily represented than in others; Dr. Sparling explained this by the fact that most of the local business schools and colleges would not train Negroes for secretarial or clerical positions. (After voting to compel Dr. Sparling to supply this information, the board instructed the secretary to strike from the records the names of the men who had moved and seconded the motion.)

The friction between the administration and the board over quotas and general racial questions was increased by sharp differences of opinion on other issues. The chairman of the board, William P. Wiseman, another wealthy Chicagoan, criticized Dr. Sparling for tolerating the discussion of such "controversial subjects" as "racial, religious, and labor problems" in the college. When Dr. Sparling suggested that the college should "service labor" in the community in the same manner that it had long been "servicing" business, the suggestion was promptly and coldly turned down by the board. At the time of the Montgomery, Ward strike, Dr. Sparling spoke at a mass-meeting called by the striking union; this of course, did not enhance his popularity with the board members. Yet Dr. Sparling had made a fine record at Central College. When he became president in 1936, the college had an indebtedness of $75,000. By February, 1945, this debt had been paid, and the college was $11,000 ahead for that month in the year. In addition, Dr. Sparling had managed to add $100,000 to salaries, had created a $52,000 stabilization fund, and had increased endowments and enrolment.

At a board meeting on February 7, 1945, Dr. Sparling was told that his "qualifications were not compatible with the requirements of the position of president," and it was suggested that he look for another job. A member of the board added that since he seemed to be interested in Negroes, he might want to get a job with the Rosenwald Foundation or possibly "go down and live with the Negroes." On April 17 Dr. Sparling resigned under protest. The faculty promptly met and by a vote of forty-nine to fifteen indicated lack of confidence in the board of directors, and then, by a vote of sixty-two to one, decided that it would be desirable to have the college severed from Y. M. C. A. control and direction. This decision was supported by a large section of the student body, which voted 488 to 2 in favor of it—not all the students who wanted to vote could crowd into the small auditorium at the school.

In the meantime Dr. Sparling had managed to interest Marshall Field, the fairy godmother of American liberalism, and Dr. Edwin R. Embree of the Rosenwald Foundation in the idea of starting a new college. Large funds were not needed, for Central College—and the fact is quite remarkable—had been able to pay nearly 90 per cent of its expenses out of tuition fees. Originally Dr. Sparling planned to call the new college the Thomas Jefferson College, but after the death of President Roosevelt in April letters, telegrams, and telephone calls poured in suggesting it should be named Roosevelt College.

Thus within a few weeks Central Y. M. C. A. College had severed itself from the Y. M. C. A. and become Roosevelt College. There is no precedent in American educational annals, so far as I can discover, for the action of the faculty, who not only supported the stand taken by Dr. Sparling but followed him out of Central College and into Roosevelt College. Approximately 80 per cent of the faculty resigned their positions when Dr. Sparling resigned as president. Today in its new headquarters at 231 South Wells Street, Chicago, Roosevelt College promises to become an important institution of learning. Some 1,400 students are enrolled—and no questions are asked about the number of Jewish or Negro students. Since Chicago has no publicly supported liberal college offering education above the sophomore year, Roosevelt College, with its relatively low tuition fees, will fill a real need in the community. Only one-fifth of the 20,000 high-school graduates in Chicago now go on to college.

To their amazement the board of directors of Central Y. M. C. A. College discovered that a college is something more than its charter, board of directors, equipment, desks, furniture, books, and bank account. It discovered that a college is primarily a community of students and educators, and that the community is really the owner of the college. This ownership was proved when the faculty and students walked out. Nothing was then left of Central College except an irate board of directors, some empty offices and unused equipment, and a discredited Jim Crow heritage.

In setting up Roosevelt College Dr. Sparling decided that

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he would try to have a board that would never want to dictate an undemocratic policy to the faculty. The board of Roosevelt College is drawn from labor, management, capital, cooperatives, government, the professions, social scientists, the press, and educators. Five members of the faculty are represented on it. The chairman is Dr. Edwin R. Embree; the vice-chairman is Percy L. Julian, the brilliant Negro chemist. For some reason, Newton C. Farr is not on the new board. He is scheduled, however, to be elected president of the Civil War Round Table Club in January.

[*This is the second of several letters from the Middle West and West.*]

Victory for the Fatherland Front

BY PHILIP JORDAN

(The Nation's *correspondent in Southeastern Europe; formerly the London* News-Chronicle's *chief foreign correspondent*)

Sofia, November 18

HOWEVER illiberal and undemocratic the principle on which the Bulgarian elections were held yesterday, the actual voting was conducted in a manner with which no impartial observer could have found fault. Foreign observers were free to go where they wished, to arrive at any place without warning, and to be present in the booths during the actual voting. No doubt if they had possessed the necessary competence they could have watched the counting of the votes, but none did; and none, therefore, have a right to doubt the final figures issued by the government this evening. These final figures show that 86 per cent of the eligible population voted, and that 88 per cent of the 86 per cent cast their ballots in favor of the Fatherland Front, as the somewhat doubtful amalgam of parties calls itself. This means that just under three-quarters of the entire adult population, less those few who have been deprived of their civil rights, voted to maintain in power the combination which has governed since the so-called revolution of September 9, 1944, when the Germanophile government of King Boris was thrown out just before the Russian army occupied the country. But while an impartial observer must pay tribute to the absolute secrecy of the balloting, he cannot uphold the way the elections were staged.

In itself the Fatherland Front is an admirable idea. It contains the seeds of an effective democracy, having originally comprised all those parties in the state which were hostile to the Germanophile policies of the late Czar. Its leadership fell naturally to the best-organized, the best-disciplined party in the country, the party which had had years of experience in underground work. The Communists were a minority, but their fanaticism, and their close ties with the Soviet Union, made them the general staff of revolt.

When the Germans were finally driven out of Bulgaria by the advance of the Red Army and the success of the British and American forces on the western front—to hear a Bulgarian talk you would think they had fought the Germans single-handed—the necessity for one party's leadership came to an end. But supported by the presence, rather than the active interference, of Russian troops on Bulgarian soil, the Communists insisted on dominating the Front. And though a minority, they were able to dominate it because they retained in their hands the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the entire life of the country through its police.

This insistence lead to schisms, and the major party in the nation, the Agrarians, walked out of the Front, leaving behind a mere rump subservient to the wishes of the Communist Party. It is almost impossible to say what proportion of the Agrarians walked out and what proportion remained beneath the banner of the Hammer and Sickle. The only measure that the outsider can discover is the sale of the newspapers which each branch controls. It is a rough-and-ready guide but probably a fairly accurate one. On November 1 the newspaper *Zemedelsko Zname,* organ of the Agrarians remaining in the Front, had a sale in Sofia of 1,900 copies. On the same day the *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname,* organ of the opposition Agrarians, sold 35,250 copies, which was, incidentally, the largest number sold by any newspaper circulating in Sofia. The next largest sales were those of the *Otechestven Front,* the official government organ—28,760 copies—and of the *Rabotnichesko Delo,* the Communist Party's daily—32,150 copies.

A third important section of the Fatherland Front is the Zveno, the political branch of the former Military League. The Zveno is nominally headed by Kimon Georgiev, the Prime Minister, but is actually the instrument of General Damian Velchev, at one time one of the most ardent persecutors of Communists that even this country has produced. But if necessity makes strange bedfellows, so does expediency, and so does cynical opportunism; and today General Velchev tucks up with as remarkable a man as this country has yet given to the world, Georgi Dimitrov, legendary hero of the Nazi Reichstag-fire trial and one of the first European fighters against fascism. It is not a pleasant sight to see these two heads lying on the same pillow; and when one finds the representatives of the Communist newspapers of the world clapping a speech by Velchev, one may, I think, be forgiven if one asks them if they can recall the dishonoring words they so properly wrote about the man only eleven years ago, when by a coup d'état he abolished the only semblance of liberal government this country has ever enjoyed.

The rest of the Fatherland Front is made up of political odds and ends split off from the remaining parties, somewhat as the tail of a lizard splits off from the body without doing it any noticeable injury. There are a few Social Democrats, an Independent or so, and a small group of characters who call themselves Radicals and have no discoverable principle unless the desire for power be counted as one.

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The opposition consists mainly of the vast body of Agrarians who have few or no political objectives and to whom security is all that matters. They form a large proportion of the population, though just how large one cannot say. One may doubt that they include as high a percentage of the small-holding peasants as the leaders claim. A new spirit has come from the east and north, a new hope, and it has been dinned into peasant heads without respite since the Germans left. Some have certainly embraced that hope, far more probably than any British or American observer could determine, though it is likely that any absolutely free election would still show a majority for the opposition.

Here it must be said that if ever an opposition displayed complete lack of common sense this one did. It was maladroit in the extreme, and by unscrupulously exploiting the non-recognition policy of the United States and Great Britain it succeeded in identifying our two countries in the majority of minds with the worst possible form of reaction. Indeed, you hardly hear any mention of the Western democracies; they are spoken of as "Western reaction." Until the day of the election there were actually people in this capital who were afraid to be seen in public places with American or British citizens lest they should lay themselves open to a charge of collaboration with the enemies of the people.

The responsibility for this attitude lies not so much with the government as with its opponents, who have pursued a policy of absolute non-cooperation with the Fatherland Front in the belief that British and American power was behind them and would see to it that one fine day the reins of government were handed to them. Up to the last minute they believed the visit of Mark Ethridge, special observer for Secretary Byrnes, would succeed in postponing the elections. They could not have misread the situation more if they had tried deliberately to do so. The power and prestige of the Fatherland Front depended absolutely on the punctual holding of the elections, which had been postponed once. That was priority number one. If the elections had been delayed farther, the dominant Communist faction within the Front would have been decisively defeated and might never have regained its power. So smart a tactician as Dimitrov knew this as well as anybody, and for him and his followers, till yesterday evening, there was nothing that could begin to compare in importance with the elections.

Not that British and American wishes have been entirely neglected. On the contrary, thanks largely to the energy and frankness of the United States Minister, Maynard Barnes, and thanks also to the mere presence in Bulgaria of Mark Ethridge, the Fatherland Front has begun to adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward those who disagree with it. From them the Front has nothing to fear so far as internal affairs are concerned. The opposition is hopelessly split, has no leaders worthy of the name, no policy beyond a wringing of the hands, and is firmly convinced that it is for Britain and America to pull it out of the mess created by its own ineptitude.

Dimitrov's speech three days ago offered rights to and imposed duties on the opposition if it wishes to play a part in modern Bulgaria. His speech indicated a complete change of attitude. Only ten days before, on his arrival from Moscow, he had threatened fire and the sword to those who opposed the Fatherland Front. The speech was a failure: even the faithful, who had governed for more than a year on the orders which he telephoned from Moscow, were upset. Even they had hoped for some measure of conciliation. Dimitrov, an adroit and experienced politician, trained in the logical expediency of Kremlin politics, was quick to see his mistake. He changed his tune, and his speech was welcomed both in government and in opposition circles with a sigh of relief. It foreshadowed, despite its bitter attack on "Western reaction," a policy designed to win with as little delay as possible that recognition from the Western democracies which the more vocal and intransigent Communists declare to be a matter of indifference to them. The contrary is the truth: now that the elections are out of the way, recognition has become the new priority number one.

The predicted reign of terror has not materialized; once it became certain that the elections would no longer be postponed, the need for violence disappeared. Not all the King's horses nor all the King's men—to say nothing of the President's—can undo what was achieved yesterday. If the new government proves politically wise, practices a decent moderation, and tolerates the pinpricks of an impotent opposition, it will surely receive recognition. There may be some delay: the government is well aware of that, but it can afford to wait, the more so as both the British and the American authorities are inclined to resume at least commercial relations.

How far the Soviet Union interferes in Bulgarian affairs it is hard to determine. By garrisoning the country with a minimum of 100,000 men it commits, of course, an act of the highest interference, and it can no more claim to be disinterested than the British can claim to be disinterested in Greece. The Russian troops here have behaved well but are none the less a burden on the somewhat strained economy of the country. Their mere physical presence is an immense aid to the government, encouraging people who might think twice about it to vote for the maintenance of the Fatherland Front as at present constituted. Certainly the actual membership of the Communist Party has at least doubled since the war began drawing to an end in this part of the world; many new adherents have come from the ranks of those who are either frightened or desire jobs. My own impression, which would be disputed by both the American and the British Mission, is that in any free election the Communists would have received perhaps 30 per cent of the votes, certainly no more; and they know it or they would have willingly consented to the holding of such free elections. As it is they dominate the government; more, they swamp it. The coalition has granted them approximately 50 per cent of the seats, and the other 50 per cent, held by the Agrarian rump, will be filled with Communists masquerading as Agrarians.

Yet however much one may deplore this open jury-packing, it is impossible to withhold admiration altogether from the Fatherland Front. The contribution of Bulgarian partisans to the war was negligible, but they did create a spirit in this country which can shake it from its apathy and give self-respect to its citizens. They began a revolution which is but half finished. They began it on the old model—terror, intimidation, murder, and plunder; but they seem to be going to finish it on the new model—persuasion, good government, and tolerance of the enemy once his claws are drawn.

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EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS

Friction in the North Atlantic

AFTER a wordy battle operators of North Atlantic air routes have settled down to an uneasy truce pending a meeting in early January, when an effort will be made to prevent the development of rate wars. For the time being Pan-American World Airways and American Overseas Airways are both to charge $375, the pre-war rate, for passengers flying from New York to England, and both have permits to make seven round trips a week, though provisionally they are regularly scheduling five each. Presumably the British Overseas Airways Corporation will adjust its rates accordingly, but at present it is hardly competing with the two American lines, for it is not yet equipped for winter flying over the North Atlantic and its two flights weekly are on a roundabout southern route.

The recent ructions were precipitated when Pan-American announced it was slashing one-way passenger rates from the war-time level of $572 to $275. It justified this cut on the ground that it had been able to reduce costs by switching from its old sea-planes to more modern land-based aircraft which could be operated more cheaply. Other operators raised their eyebrows at this claim. For while there is no doubt that when really large planes with a carrying capacity of two hundred or so are available much lower fares will be economically possible, it is questionable whether with the Douglas DC-4's now being used to transport twenty-five or fewer passengers, Pan-American's cut rates would cover all costs. It has been noted that on its Latin American routes, where it has less present and prospective competition, Pan-American has been content with a much more modest revision of fares. In fact, it has left the Miami-Rio de Janeiro rate at $425, while that to Buenos Aires has been marked down by only $5 to $490. Hence there is some reason to suspect that in offering its transatlantic bargain the company was following chain-store merchandising practice and putting an attractive "loss-leader" in its show window.

Pan-American, it must be remembered, has a well-deserved reputation as an aggressive fighter. For years before the war it successfully blocked every attempt by other American air lines to break into international flying. Then when the domestic companies banded together to press their claims for post-war overseas routes, Pan-American put on a great campaign to get its de facto monopoly legalized. Senator McCarran, its "chosen instrument" on Capitol Hill, brought forward a bill to create a single American "flag line" to which all overseas traffic would be intrusted. Domestic air lines would have been permitted to participate in this venture, but obviously Pan-American would have formed its core. Senator McCarran pushed this plan hard, but it bogged down in committee after the Administration plunked for the principle of competition abroad as well as at home.

Last summer the Civil Aeronautics Board allotted North Atlantic routes to American Overseas Airlines and Transcontinental and Western Air over the protests of Pan-American. The latter's recent rate cut, therefore, seems to say very clearly, "You asked for competition; very well then, we promise you a bellyful." That is not to say its tactics are just a matter of spite. On the contrary, Juan Trippe, chairman of Pan-American, a cool and calculating strategist, is surely thinking in terms of long-range policy. By announcing his cut, even though he was almost immediately forced to withdraw it, he advertised his company as the protagonist of cheap air travel. He has done something to remove the horns of monopoly from the public image of Pan-American, substituting for them the halo of the thwarted pioneer. In time to come, if the competitive system raises too much hell on the North Atlantic, his record may be put to profitable use.

Meanwhile the threatened rate war has served to call attention once again to the lamentable results of the failure of America and Britain to reach an agreement at last year's Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago. It will be recalled that no compromise was reached between opposing points of view on the third and fourth "freedoms of the air," which involve the right of authorized air-transport operators to land passengers and freight in any country and to pick up traffic destined for their country of origin. The American delegation insisted that these freedoms should be enjoyed competitively, with no economic controls except those imposed on operators by their own governments. The British maintained that unless competition on international routes was regulated by an international authority, it would be impossible to avoid rate wars leading to competitive subsidies.

This unresolved issue not only blocked a general agreement at Chicago; it has served since to delay a bilateral agreement between America and Britain providing for reciprocal commercial air rights. Hence the obsolete agreement of 1937, which allowed for two weekly round trips by the air lines of each country, still holds. The additional flights which Britain has in fact permitted to American operators represent an uncovenanted act of grace. That is why the British government was able to discipline Pan-American, when it effected its rate cut without prior consultation, by reducing its schedules to the original two a week.

Hopes of a new agreement now depend on the success of the North Atlantic operators' conference which is meeting under the auspices of the International Air Transport Association next month. If this body is able to establish machinery for fixing minimum rates and maximum schedules and for preventing rate wars, the British may regard it as a voluntary substitute for the authoritative International Aeronautics Board they failed to obtain at Chicago. In this case auspices should be good for a new Anglo-American agreement providing for a much-expanded volume of traffic between the two countries. But Britain will not offer facilities for a competitive free-for-all which, in view of the commanding lead enjoyed in civil aviation by this country, would mean American domination of the international air. Before condemning this attitude it might be well to bear in mind that the United States is equally unwilling to leave its merchant marine at the mercy of free competition.

KEITH HUTCHISON

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The People's Front

ALMOST simultaneously England and France have passed laws to nationalize banking. The parallelism of these projects marks the profound social transformation that is taking place in Europe, a transformation born of the conviction that the road to recovery runs to the left, in the direction of socialism. The parallel is all the more striking because the economies of the two nations are so different. England is an industrial country which for more than a century has had to import the bulk of its foodstuffs. France, on the other hand, has been until now one of the few industrial countries capable of feeding itself. The war has accentuated these differences: in spite of the blitz England's industrial plants and transport are relatively intact; those of France have been largely destroyed. Yet British Labor and the French resistance are moving in the same direction.

Disappointed by the foreign policy of the British Labor government, many people are apt to lose sight of its accomplishments in the domestic field. Here at least it is conscious of its power. Harold Laski said to me the other day, "Those who predict a short life for the new government are fooling themselves; this time Labor is in power for ten years." That explains the new tone in the speeches of the Labor Ministers. It is not as it was in 1924. Sharp-tongued Ellen Wilkinson and Aneurin Bevan, long recognized as one of the most eloquent speakers in the House, bear little resemblance to their counterparts in the government of Ramsay MacDonald. Even quiet Hugh Dalton in his budget speech gave the impression that Labor is ready to embark on a genuinely Socialist program; for the first time a Chancellor of the Exchequer dared to define prosperity not in terms of dividends but of production and purchasing power. He spoke with still greater assurance in introducing the bill to nationalize the Bank of England. Four days after the second reading two more nationalization measures—cable and wireless and air transport—were proposed. And while nationalization of railways is not included in the legislative program for the current session of Parliament, the railway companies have already gone on the defensive with propaganda designed to prove that their performance during the war was excellent and that nationalization can only result in a decrease of efficiency. They have revived the old saws about "removal of the competitive spur" and "introduction of control by stick-in-the-mud bureaucrats." But the Labor press has retaliated with the reminder that the fastest scheduled run on the British railways, that of the privately owned L. N. E. R. line's "Coronation," holds fifty-second place in the list of the world's high-speed runs.

Twenty years ago a hesitant and conciliatory Labor Party government faced an aggressive Tory-Liberal majority in Parliament. The Liberals have remained true to this old marriage of convenience; two weeks ago they supported Churchill's motion of censure against the government. But this time Labor has an absolute majority in the House; and when Mr. Churchill accuses the government of driving England to socialism, even the gentle Mr. Attlee retorts that it was for this the British people put Labor in power on July 5.

In France the picture is the same. During the Popular Front the "Liberals" of France, the Radical Socialist Party, held the majority. They could—and did—write the death warrant of any Cabinet that even whispered the word nationalization; directly or indirectly they sabotaged every measure that meant a change in France's social or economic structure. Last week, however, by a vote of 521 to 35, the Constituent Assembly approved a proposal to nationalize the banks that goes even farther than the British act; it includes, in addition to the Banque de France, six other powerful banking and credit houses, among them the Crédit Lyonnais, the Société Générale, and the Comptoir d'Escompte. The new law has its weak points, especially in regard to compensation, but it marks a big step forward: the Prime Minister will no longer, as in the time of Léon Blum, be at the mercy of the directors of the Banque de France and the "two hundred families." The Socialists and Communists together had enough votes to pass the bill, but they were joined by the M. R. P., which as a party created by the resistance also knows that there can be no return to the old big-business dictatorship of French political life.

In the devastated countries private capital has launched the slogan, "You can't socialize ruins," but the contrary is the truth: only by socializing ruins can Europe recover. In England, in France, in all of Europe, popular thinking is focused on Socialist planning, just as half a century ago liberal thought revolved around the problem of political freedom. Among the highly industrialized democratic countries Czechoslovakia has adopted a program of 70 per cent nationalization, including even pottery, porcelain, glass, cement, and textiles. In those agrarian countries where land reform takes the place of industrial nationalization, the same trend can be discovered; by last August Hungary had broken up its feudal estates and distributed four million acres of land to three-quarters of a million peasants.

Everywhere the desire for change is visible. The other day as he was passing through a little village at the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier on his way to Belgrade, Kingsley Martin, editor of the London *New Statesman and Nation,* saw a poster which read, "We have no need of the past." If those Americans to whom the word socialism is anathema were to cross the Atlantic, they would find few allies apart from those who financed Hitler and Mussolini or the Romans who are urging a ten-year American military occupation of Italy to forestall "disorders." And the editorial writer of the New York *Herald Tribune* who recently denounced the "silly and irresponsible" Laski would discover that free enterprise and market economy are becoming as obsolete in Europe as horse cars are in the streets of New York.

DEL VAYO

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

ARGUMENT ON RIME

Karl Shapiro Objects

DEAR SIRS: With your permission I would like to make a reply to Delmore Schwartz's review of my "Essay on Rime" in *The Nation* of November 10—Delmore's remarks are set off by quotes.

1. Shapiro has discovered that "the modern poet depends too much upon scansion by count of ear." This statement appears nowhere in my book, either by inference or by assertion and betrays a wish on Delmore's part to have me condemn all of modern poetry.

2. Shapiro confounds scansion by count of ear "with such devices as Cummings's typography and with his own misunderstanding of Bridges's analysis of Milton's blank verse." I have numbered the lines of my book for people like Delmore who lose the place. If Delmore will turn to line 500 and begin reading he will see that I consider "typography" an entirely separate branch of modern poetry, having no connection with scansion by count of ear. My own "misunderstanding of Bridges's analysis of Milton's blank verse" is just one of those things. I read Bridges's book and Delmore read it as he read "Essay on Rime." Bridges wrote a book called "On the Elements of Milton's Blank Verse in Paradise Lost," in which Bridges discovered that the typical line has (1) ten syllables, (2) with five stresses, (3) in rising rhythm. All these elements Milton varied according to an elaborately schematized system of supernumerary syllables, elisions, contractions, and stress inversions—as I said in simpler language in my essay.

3. "In belief, the failure is disbelief, the effort to find beliefs, and an acceptance of the doctrines of Freud." Delmore will please notice that I defend the literary uses of Freud in Joyce but not in the case of the literary amateur. Delmore will deny that any such distinction between Joyce and, say, Delmore exists.

4. Delmore asserts that the "Essay" contains "countless errors of fact and interpretation," but manages to root out only differences of opinion. If Delmore is preparing a large-scale study of my errors, he can put me down for ten copies. Delmore thinks Marianne Moore's line about disliking poetry is ironical. I disagree with Delmore and therefore commit an error either of fact or interpretation. *Ex cathedra Delmoris.* Delmore takes exception to my naming psychoanalysis a therapy and italicizes the word in horror. Here I commit not an error but a sin, because to Delmore psychoanalysis seems to be a religion. Delmore objects to my calling Poe the Lenin of the symbolists. On second thought and in deference to Delmore I am having this changed to the Trotsky of the symbolists.

5. "If it seems contradictory to praise the master for qualities for which the follower is censured, and the whole of modern poetry condemned, the explanation is that Shapiro's praise is really half-hearted and ambiguous." I like the word "ambiguous." Delmore wants like hell for me to condemn "the whole of modern poetry" in order to classify me safely as an "anti-intellectual and philistine." This classification would fill one or two of the empty pigeonholes in Delmore's head. It's no fit, Delmore. I do not condemn "the whole of modern poetry"; I am too *ambiguous.*

6. "Shapiro condemns intellectuals more than anyone else." Delmore wants like hell for me to condemn intellectuals, but the fact is that I defend Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound, Eliot, Auden, Joyce, Lucretius, Donne, Yeats, Lawrence, Hart Crane, Barker, MacNeice, Freud, Poe, and even Dante. What I do attack is—but look, Delmore, I wrote a book on that subject. The name of it is "Essay on Rime."

7. Shapiro's condemnation of intellectuals "suggests powerfully that the attack on criticism is a fear of critics, and the hatred of the intellectual a fear of the intellect." My "condemnation of the intellectuals" (see paragraph 6, *supra*) suggests powerfully no such thing, Delmore. No poet of my generation has had more decent and generous treatment from critics than I. I fear no critic, even you, Delmore. Nor does my "hatred of the intellectual" suggest powerfully a fear of the intellect. I fear no intellect, even yours, Delmore. I do confess that your criticism baffles me somewhat, which is not the case with the "intellectuals" above. I put this down as a blind spot in my make-up.

I would like to register a protest with *The Nation's* literary editor for printing a piece of criticism as invidious and deliberately falsified as Delmore Schwartz's review of "Essay on Rime." I make no claims for my book and am interested solely in an honest representation of its contents. There seems to be a slump in the art of book reviewing when the personal rancor of an embittered young man passes for literary judgment in the pages of *The Nation.* KARL SHAPIRO

Mr. Schwartz: Chapter and Verse

DEAR SIRS: Karl Shapiro's objections to my review show the same ignorance as his book. Some of his seven points are merely personal abuse, and the others, except for the first one, come from an extraordinary misunderstanding of what I said in my review and what some authors have said in their books. At the same time Shapiro sidesteps or ignores many of the critical objections which I made in my review.

Point 1. The phrase "scansion by count of ear" is an error in the review for which *The Nation* is responsible. I wrote "scansion by count of eye," and the change must have been made in the proof. Point 2 is closely connected with Point 1 and can be answered at the same time. In "Milton's Prosody" Bridges tried to show that Milton was able "to invert the accent of any foot" (Bridges, page 35), if he restricted every line to ten syllables, by means of such devices as elision. Bridges then attempted to go farther than Milton and write syllabic verse in which accent was entirely disregarded: the only measure of the line was the *number* of syllables. Shapiro

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confuses Milton's *inversion* of accent with Bridges's *disregard* of accent, a very different thing. Shapiro further confuses both of these practices with imagist meters, which depend wholly on accent and disregard the number of syllables in a line. The confusion becomes enormous when Cummings's use of the look of print on a page is also named by Shapiro as one more example of "visual prosody," to use his strange solecism. As I said in my review, such errors would not matter if Shapiro were not writing about prosody as such.

Point 3 is an example of Shapiro's pretense of defending an error when he is merely making a personal attack upon his critic. I do not deny that there is a distinction between James Joyce and myself. I cannot conceive even by means of fantasy how anything I've ever said suggested such an identification, even in terms of literary influence. Meanwhile by means of slipping into a senseless personal attack, Shapiro evades the very issue he has raised: What is wrong with the beliefs of modern poets? The question of Joyce's use of Freud is Shapiro's red herring.

Point 4 is a confusion in part of Point 3. The confusion is so complete that it is necessary to separate out three elements. First, Shapiro thinks that I italicized the word "therapy" because I think that psychoanalysis is a religion. I think nothing of the sort. Even if I thought it a religion, it is still inconceivable that I would deny that it is a therapy. Shapiro's failure to understand the italics is an instance of his general incompetence as a reader. The italicizing of therapy was an effort to note one of Shapiro's countless errors, for he wrote that Freudian therapy is deductive and deterministic, while as a therapy, as a method of curing nervous illness, the analyst depends upon the emotional transformation of the patient, the liberation of repressed emotional patterns by means of transference, the analysis of dreams, free association, and the like, none of which is either religious or deterministic. Shapiro's error is to take Freud's assumption that all mental acts are caused and attach it foolishly to the actual practice of the analyst. This brings us back to the literary uses of Freud, Joyce's or my own. When Shapiro speaks of "Finnegans Wake" as "an exercise in Freudian philology," he misrepresents Freud, philology, and "Finnegans Wake." Philology is the science of liguistics. Freud was not interested in philology but in the way that uses and misuses of language, especially free associations, make clear the unconscious motives of the psyche. Joyce made use of these Freudian and Jungian discoveries in "Finnegans Wake," but he made use of many other important devices. The phrase "Freudian philology" is actually without meaning.

Second, Shapiro's misunderstanding of Marianne Moore's line is not a matter of interpretation but of fact. If there is no distinction between errors of fact and errors of interpretation, then anything can be said about anything. Apart from the clear absurdity of thinking that a practicing poet like Miss Moore actually dislikes poetry, the poem itself says: "Reading it [poetry], however, with a perfect contempt for it, one discovers in it, after all, a place for the genuine . . . these things [of poetry] are important . . . because they are useful . . . if you demand . . . what is genuine, you are interested in poetry." It is a pity to disfigure thus a wonderful poem, but the poem is too long to quote entire, and the reader will have to read it as a whole if he doubts that it is a matter of

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fact, not interpretation, that Miss Moore does *not* dislike poetry and wrote an ironic line.

Shapiro again appears to be incapable of understanding what I said when he suggests that in objecting to Poe as "the Lenin of the symbolists" I was making some kind of political point which would be rectified by substituting the name of Trotsky. The foolishness, which I thought palpable, was in the incongruity of the comparison: one might as well say that Longfellow was the Kerensky, Baudelaire the Bukharin, Mallarmé the Molotov, and Valéry the Stalin of the symbolists. The point, to state it with the utmost directness, is that Poe and Lenin do not resemble each other.

Point 5 begins with an equivocation upon the word "ambiguous," which means doubtful and uncertain. Any number of passages illustrate Shapiro's condemnation of the whole of modern poetry. On page 19 of his book he writes: "Though some have strength that penetrates and burns/ The *total* is *aberration*" (my italics). On page 48 he says that he cannot agree with Yeats that the last forty years have produced more good poetry than any generation since the Elizabethans. On page 68 he concludes his attack by speaking of "the *norm* and *type* of modern rime" (my italics) as "senseless violence," "a brawl of vocatives," "the vestigial proof of nothing," and as a synoptic title he uses the phrase, "the dead hand and exhaustion of our rime." It is true that elsewhere Shapiro eats and praises his cake before he denounces it, and the quotation from page 19 is a brief instance of this effort to deny and affirm at the same time. In my review I cited his praise of "Ulysses," which is contradicted by the statement that "the price that he [Joyce] paid for greatness is too dear." Shapiro makes no effort to show that this is not a contradiction, in so far as it makes any sense whatever.

Shapiro's list of the authors whom he admires and defends is either disingenuous or an evasion. The example of Joyce can stand for all of them, for the same process of mind is involved. In his poem Shapiro says that for "the breakdown" in language "Joyce is as much to blame as any man." I pointed this out in my review, and Shapiro ignores the point. Is it possible that he does not understand that you cannot accuse a man of being responsible for the breakdown in language and at the same time claim that you admire and defend him? Is it possible to speak of the breakdown and confusion in prosody, language, and belief, and yet claim that you are not attacking the character of modern poetry?

Points 6 and 7, like Point 5, are efforts on Shapiro's part to repudiate what he says in his book again and again. On page 2 he writes, "My only answer is that criticism/ Has charted poetry into dangerous narrows/ And dashed its own brains out upon the rocks/ Of absolute meaning," whatever absolute meaning may mean. On page 65 he objects to the way in which "Our talk . . . dilates on right and wrong,/ Values in point-of-view, criteria/ In taste, and criticism in everything." If Shapiro is not objecting to criticism here, then he is saying nothing. On the same page he speaks of how poetry "as a vision of the soul," whatever that may signify, "Descended . . . into the poetry of ideas," and then Poe as Lenin leads to the statement that "the yeast of *criticism* worked, and rime/ Declined to *verbiage*" (my italics), which is to say that after Poe poetry degenerated. If this is not an attack on modern poetry, on criticism, on the critic and the intellectual, then words do not mean anything.

There are a number of other passages which might have served as well to show that Shapiro does condemn the whole of modern poetry, the critic and the intellectual, but it is obviously impossible to quote at length from a book which is bad throughout—bad as poetry, ignorant as criticism, and shocking in its inaccuracies and misconstructions. Shapiro's letter adds to his book in this sense; he shows himself either unaware of the nature of his opinions or unwilling to take any responsibility for them.

DELMORE SCHWARTZ

Hayes Tells All

WARTIME MISSION IN SPAIN, 1942-45. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. The Macmillan Company. $3.

ALREADY the interest in Professor Hayes's self-congratulatory memoirs is mainly antiquarian. At San Francisco the United Nations Organization resolved that it would not admit Spain as long as the Franco regime remained in power; this decision was confirmed at Potsdam; President Roosevelt's instructions to Norman Armour, when he replaced Hayes last spring, made it clear that the United States, like all other decent governments, wants nothing to do with Franco. Hayes does not refer to any of these important statements, which are in such contradiction to the policy he pursued, but they explain the defensive tone of an apologia which manages to be both ill-natured and complacent.

Hayes tells us, with candid self-approval, that the newspaper comment on his appointment as ambassador to Franco Spain was "almost universally favorable and commendatory." Only *The Nation* "expressed dissatisfaction," but he explains that this publication "could hardly be satisfied by any action affecting Spain short of a declaration of war." Hayes's self-satisfaction continued, and he finds now that he made only one small error—he failed to anticipate Franco's grant of a special extra credit to Hitler—against scores committed by the BEW, the OWI, the State Department, under pressure from the "extremist press" to be sure, and even by Sir Samuel Hoare. Hayes had had no diplomatic experience, he could not speak Spanish, he had never been in Spain; but he tells us that he had written some Spanish history and was a Catholic, so that was enough for Roosevelt, whose policy toward Franco is the most inexplicable failure of his Administration.

More important considerations apart, "Wartime Mission in Spain" will at least lay to rest the curious supposition that Hayes had any affection for liberalism or democracy. Actually, his book "The Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900," published in 1941, is one long sneer at liberal European statesmen and their reforms in the age of Gladstone. Like Archbishop Spellman, Hayes adopts the device of setting down the more outrageous statements of Franco, Jordana, *et al.* without direct comment but with implied approval. But he lacks the urbanity and the smooth rhetoric of the Archbishop. He would have been well advised to leave his defense to Messrs. Lindley and Weintal, whose apologia in *Harper's* of December, 1944, was a much smoother job.

Hayes was ambassador in Madrid from May, 1942, to January, 1945. As early as 1943 he had informed the State

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Department of his great work: "Keeping the Axis-created regime out of the war," he said, "and bringing it progressively to the side of the United States will eventually be adjudged by informed public opinion as one of the outstanding diplomatic victories of the war and one which, through insuring Allied control of the Strait of Gibraltar and of the western Mediterranean, may prove decisive in bringing about the defeat of the Axis." He makes bold, in fact, to claim that he changed Franco from pro-Axis "non-belligerency" to pro-Allied "benevolent neutrality," despite the "sniping" from the "extremist" American press.

There is, of course, no doubt that from the time the United States entered the war, and particularly after the success of our landing in North Africa, Franco began to see that his Axis pals were losing. Hence we may accept Hayes's claim that many Allied airmen, French patriots, and Jewish refugees from Hitler did get out of Spain. (I have talked to many Jews and Frenchmen who spent months in concentration camps during this period, however, and they do not share the Ambassador's enthusiasm for Franco.) It is true also that Spain eventually shipped less wolfram to Germany than in the early days of the war, and finally stopped it entirely. But the Germans, as BEW records will show, until the eve of our invasion of France continued to get all they really needed —including the wolfram supplied by Salazar and shipped through Spain—and the embargo was imposed only because the State Department, over Hayes's violent protests, had cut off Franco's supplies of oil.

Hayes's major claim is that he prevented the Germans from attacking us through Spain when we landed in North Africa. That was in November, 1942, and for months we kept 250,000 men, who were badly needed at Kasserine Pass, on guard at the Spanish Moroccan border. There was a bare possibility then that the Germans might come through Spain, though Franco, foreseeing their defeat, did not want them to. It would have been far different if the Germans had had the foresight to attack Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, or even as late as 1941. But it was the German attack on Russia, not Hayes, that saved Spain. It is typical equally of his egotism and of his bad judgment that Hayes considered the threat from the Germans even greater after the conquest of North Africa, and even after the capture of Naples, than it was before. So he busied himself all the more getting oil for Franco and an American visa for the son of the Foreign Minister, Jordana. It may come as a shock, even to those who knew some of Hayes's activities in Madrid, that he also wanted the United States to supply military matériel to Franco, who needed modern equipment and was still relying, as he had been since 1936, on Hitler. (Hayes tells us this himself, explaining that he wanted to keep the Nazis from getting extra pesetas, but Franco solved the problem by giving Germany a special credit.)

Hayes devotes much attention to the "success" of the American preemptive buying program in Spain. His summary of the resultant benefits to the Spanish fascists and their unwillingness to impose an embargo on wolfram shipments to Germany is of course sympathetic. It is also unconsciously revealing. "If the Germans," as he says, "couldn't get wolfram from Spain, the Allies, who didn't really need it, would at once stop buying it. A panic would follow the boom. And how then could Spain meet her requirements for foreign imports of petroleum, wheat, fertilizer, machinery, and *arms?*" (italics mine). It would indeed have been regrettable if this flourishing Nazi-Falangista trade had been stopped.

With as much anger as sorrow Hayes admits there was a time indeed when our State Department unaccountably got tough, and despite his strenuous objections, appeals to Roosevelt, and the like, did cut off Franco's oil. This was its reaction to the Laurel "incident," as Hayes calls it, when the Franco regime, to the great satisfaction of the Japanese, sent a special message of good wishes to the head of the Japanese puppet government in the Philippines. This was at a moment when Hayes was assuring the department that he was doing marvels, and he could not understand the department's anger. It was all just a clerical error by Jordana, "an honest and kindly man unmistakably pro-Ally, especially pro-American," and Hayes "saw the incident in perspective." And when a couple of fascist thugs made an attack on the American consulate in Valencia, also to the annoyance of the State Department, Hayes tells us that "the actual facts, as I explained to the department, were that two Falange youngsters, aged nineteen and twenty-two respectively, misbehaved."

Hayes's expertness in logic as well as diplomacy is demonstrated by this explanation of the reasons for his trust in Lequerica, Jordana's successor, who had been Franco's contact man with Pétain: "I felt, at my first meeting with him, that he would adjust himself to changing conditions readily and vigorously. The very fact that he had been associated for four years with Vichy and was reputed to have been pro-Axis, at least in 1940-41, was likely, I reasoned, to render

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him all the more anxious to cooperate with us now that our arms were triumphing." It is evident that in Hayes's estimation there should be more rejoicing over one turncoat than over the thousands of Spanish patriots who had been fighting on our side since 1936.

Hayes's mission, with his naive enjoyment of his contacts with the Spanish dukes, and his bickerings with Hoare—the British appeaser didn't like Franco and wanted a monarchy—is over, and he is now back at Columbia. The evil he has done, however, lives on. He is right, I am afraid, when he insists that the average Spaniard did not want to get into the war, does not want a civil war, even to expel Franco. The reason is obvious. Both during the Spanish civil war and ever since, the United States and England have given continuous assistance to Franco. This has not merely strengthened the fascist regime but clearly weakened the resolve of many Spaniards who stood fast in the defense of democracy as late as the summer of 1941, when I left Spain. The World War began in Spain, but Spain is not yet liberated. Hayes and his cohorts in the State Department and the Foreign Office are responsible.

The return of Spain to a democratic, decent government is inevitable. Franco can only delay it by pretending to do away with the more obvious marks of fascism, or even, *in extremis,* by bringing back a puppet Vichyite king; a resolute stand by the United States and England will hasten his fall. The important thing is to prevent such blunders from being repeated, not only in Europe but in Asia and in South America. It is encouraging to find Hayes admitting that the majority of American public opinion was against him, and that campaigns by *PM,* Winchell, and other "extremists" at times goaded the State Department—for a short while—into taking a stand in favor of democracy. If we extremists can do more effective work hereafter, we may prevent blunders that in an atomic age will be irretrievable. Hayes's book should be a guide and an inspiration for further efforts. He has raised himself a monument more lasting than professorial brass.

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NOTES BY THE WAY

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

DIANA TRILLING, who is playing hooky for the moment from Fiction in Review—she will be back shortly—asked me to read and report on "Days and Nights" by Konstantine Simonov (Simon and Schuster, $2.75), which has had overwhelming praise from the reviewers if I may judge from an advertisement which recently appeared in *The Nation.* The book arrived late, it is more than 400 pages long, and I read every word of it. Hence this tardy comment.

"Days and Nights" is a narrative of the Battle of Stalingrad. Its author has written plays and poetry; he is also described as an outstanding war correspondent. It was the war correspondent who wrote this book. The desperate day-by-day struggle—for a ruined building, for a few feet of ground, for the bit of the shore of the Volga which the Germans briefly reached—these are its substance and background. The "story" follows the fortunes of a group of officers and a nurse. Ordinary soldiers, curiously enough, do not figure in the book at all except as they are referred to, but not portrayed, as units in military movements—which produces, I must say, somewhat the effect of "Hamlet" without Hamlet. There is a villain in the piece, a traitor who is caught before he does any great damage. There is love interest—the hero, Captain Saburov, falls in love with Anya, the nurse. They both survive for a putative happy ending.

"Days and Nights" sold 400,000 copies in Russia, and it is quite understandable that a Russian reader who brought to this book the intense emotions which the Battle of Stalingrad aroused would find in it a satisfying evocation of the struggle. Even for a non-Russian it serves to recall the emotions generated by the long-drawn-out ordeal. To recall, but not to recreate. For though we may assume that Simonov was himself deeply involved, emotional intensity is just what his book lacks. From the evidence here he is a reporter, not a novelist, and I shouldn't be surprised if his newspaper stories of Stalingrad conveyed its reality far more vividly than this fictional account, if only because he was not called upon to create characters.

I would not have finished an American counterpart of "Days and Nights." I finished Simonov's book because it is written to the current Soviet pattern and has moreover been hailed as an outstanding example of Soviet writing. I was curious to consider the significance of that pattern in the context of world literature.

The current Soviet pattern is nationalist, collectivist, monolithic. In Simonov's book the timeless human emotions—courage in the face of death, love of the village and the land, the hope of happiness when the wars are done—are all set within this triple frame of reference.

What struck me first and most forcibly was the degree to which nationalism—though it patently has validity for Russian writers and readers at this point in Soviet history—has become outmoded as far as the arts are concerned. For in the arts at least the world state has long since been established and national sovereignties discarded.

To illustrate my point: it is simply not possible to imagine the best of contemporary writers, say a Malraux or a Silone

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writing a novel in which the concept of nationalism was accepted as it is in "Days and Nights," because the main stream of human thought and imagination, of which they are a part, has long since broken out of that narrow channel.

Collectivism, of course, is in very different case. It has a future. But in Simonov's book, though it is often referred to, it figures curiously little, by comparison with patriotism, as a motivating force.

The monolithic element is most vividly reflected perhaps in the reader's awareness throughout that Simonov is a "public writer" and that his story of Stalingrad is also an exercise in public education. This factor, however relevant it may be, again, for Russian writers and readers, sets up for the non-Russian who approaches the book as literature a barrier to that direct communication between writer and reader which is surely one of the ends of literature.

I think that even John Hersey might agree that "Days and Nights" is not important from the point of view of world literature, though it may be a landmark in Soviet writing. (Personally I think Sholokhov is a better writer.) At least he took pains, in an inordinately long and cozy piece in the *New Yorker* about Simonov and his book, to say that "Days and Nights" is no "War and Peace" and that it cannot compare with "Man's Fate." Yet the total effect of his article was to give the impression that "Days and Nights" was somehow of surpassing significance. And in general the reviewers appear to have been stampeded—perhaps by the fact that it is a book about Stalingrad by a Soviet author—into behaving as if it were a good deal better than it actually is. But then of course reviewers are always being stampeded by one thing or another into behaving as if most books were a good deal better than they actually are.

In this particular case I find support for some of my own reservations—about the writing and the choice of characters—in a strange quarter. Mr. Hersey quoted, in order to dismiss, two opinions from Soviet critics. One said that Simonov had written his book with a "nerveless and indifferent hand." The other criticized the omission of "the portrait of the common soldier. . . . Without this, the picture of the fighting at Stalingrad loses greatly."

BRIEFER COMMENT

A Catholic View

FRANCIS E. MCMAHON'S liberal democratic views are well known to those who read his newspaper column. But since he touches upon the relation of his faith to his political and social views only occasionally in his journalistic writings, it is helpful to have a book from him—"A Catholic Looks at the World" (Vanguard, $2.75)—expounding the deeper religious convictions from which he draws his social views. A part of the book is devoted to criticism of Catholic conservatives and another part to a criticism of non-Catholics who identify the church too simply with social reaction. McMahon's own views are similar to those of Jacques Maritain, whom he frequently quotes. There are certain questions about the relation of an authoritarian religion to the democratic process which are not explored too profoundly. In that sense

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the book is a little too journalistic. Yet it ought to be read by non-Catholics who fail to do justice to the contribution of socially progressive Catholics to the democratic cause.

One of the advantages of a democracy is that it allows us to cooperate with many groups on various cultural, religious, and political levels according to the degree of common conviction we may be able to find on that level. It is both idle and dangerous to insist that we must have common convictions on all possible issues to be able to cooperate on those issues in which we do share a common purpose. Books such as this, therefore, have a creative function. They help us to know our friends across barriers which sometimes threaten to divide us from them completely. REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Concerning Saints

RENE FULOP-MILLER in "The Saints that Moved the World" (Crowell, $3.50) rises to something like eloquence in the longest chapter, that devoted to St. Francis; for the rest, his book is rather dull and badly written. Labeling the subjects of his study with single attributes—St. Anthony stands for Renunciation, St. Augustine for the Intellect, St. Francis for Love, St. Ignatius for Will Power, St. Teresa for Ecstasy—Mr. Fülöp-Miller imposes on himself a simplification which it is hard to redeem in a presentation of such complex characters as these. Neither the case for St. Augustine's intellect nor that for Ignatius's claim to sanctity is made very convincing; will *to* power, in fact, seems more like it in the case of the latter, all that drive, all that insistence on political organization, overshadowing, in the author's presentation at least, whatever charity there may have been in the spirit of the founder of the Jesuit order. Quoting many scientists in his introductory address to the modern reader, Mr. Fülöp-Miller protests against the too materialist views of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; he offers the reader in addition an extensive bibliography for supplementary study. The book also has an index. ROLFE HUMPHRIES

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Films

JAMES AGEE

WHILE I watched the movie which Billy Wilder and Charles Brackett have made out of Charles Jackson's story about alcoholism, "The Lost Weekend," I was pretty consistently gratified and excited. When I began to try to review it, I could not forget what Eisenstein said, years ago, when he was asked what he thought of Lewis Milestone's "All Quiet on the Western Front." He said he thought it was a good Ph.D. thesis. I am afraid that applies to "The Lost Weekend," too. I don't mean that it is stuffy: it is unusually hard, tense, cruel, intelligent, and straightforward. But I see nothing in it that is new, sharply individual, or strongly creative. It is, rather, a skilful restatement, satisfying and easy to overrate in a time of general dereliction and fatuousness, of some sound basic commonplaces.

On that scale, of course, excellent things can be done. I don't see how the drunkard's first experience of the d. t.'s could be improved on by any means except possibly a dragging-out and brutalization of its climax. Frank Faylen's performance as a male nurse is fully as right and powerful; so is a shrieking free-for-all in an alcoholic ward—which is fought, however, by an incredibly mistaken use of "background" music. Ray Milland's performance as the alcoholic Don Birnam is debatable at first, but so absorbed and persuasive as the picture moves along that he all but wins the picture and the doubters over. There are also some first-rate re-creations of place and atmosphere—a soft-leather, soft-noised cocktail lounge, and a perfect setting of the Birnam apartment, and some shots of New York streets and times of day. At best there is a purity of tone and an acuteness about a city and the people in it which belong high in the movies' great classical strain of unforced, naturalistic poetry. While you watch it, it entirely holds you.

Thinking it over, though, there are curious and disappointing things about the picture. Good as he is, Milland is too robust for the best interests of his role; and in the earlier reels, when he is still sober enough to be assessed as a normal human being, it seems clear that neither he nor the director happens to know very much about the particular kind of provincially born, genteelly bred failed-artist Milland is supposed to be playing. None of the other players seem thoroughly at home, either, in the commonplace yet extremely specialized kind of apartment they use, though Philip Terry's gentle performance as the brother is of itself good, and Jane Wyman is knowingly cast as a *Time* researcher. Howard de Silva plays the ambiguous bartender well and with force, but the force and his face, in this context, turn it into ambiguity for little tots. The players miscast as Miss Wyman's ultra-bourgeois parents are probably not to blame, but they turn a sequence where intelligence and restraint would have been particularly gratifying into heavy caricature.

The causes of Don Birnam's alcoholism were not thoroughly controlled or understood, I thought, in the novel. In the movie they hardly exist. It may have been the better part of valor not to try to tackle them, and not to dabble in streams of consciousness, but when you add to this the fact that Mr. Milland cannot convincingly put before you this particular kind of thirsty man, you can see that the picture is bound to lack certain important kinds of depth, warmth, and intensity, not to mention plain dramatic interest. It becomes, too much of the time, just a virtuoso piece about a handsome, practically unidentified maniac. In one or two scenes you get with some force the terrible humiliation which is one of the drunkard's experiences; but considering the over-all quality of the film, it is remarkable how much you seem to have been given, and how little you actually get. There is very little appreciation, for instance, of the many and subtle moods possible in drunkenness; almost no registration of the workings of the several minds inside a drinker's brain; hardly a trace of the narcissism and self-deceit which are so indispensable or of the self-loathing and self-pity which are so invariable; hardly a hint, except through abrupt action, of the desperation of thirst; no hint at all of the many colorings possible in the desperation. The hangovers lack the weakness, sickness, and horrible distortions of time-sense which they need.

It is irrevelant to the carefully developed, finely photographed, wholly objective scheme of the movie, but I cannot help suggesting that many of these failures might have been avoided if the work had been done from a little farther inside. In some respects the method would still have been objective. A few minutes of dead-silent pantomime *(without music, please!)* of deadly weakness, in hangover, for instance, might have made definitive a good deal that is here only sketched; it should be the kind of weakness in which it is virtually unbearable to lift a hand, and for some reason necessary to do much more than that. Much of the wrestling of minds and moods too, I suspect, could have been registered from outside, through lines, business, mere close-up, and posture: Chaplin, after all, has made incredibly complicated things articulate in pantomime. Surely, for one simple instance—most obviously perhaps after the dawn escape from the hospital—it would have been possible to show the abject shattering coldness to which even temperate men are liable; and perhaps also to capture, through it, the sudden annihilating loneliness and fear of God—or whatever more terrifying it may be—which are so common, if peculiar, an experience. For certain other things you would have to take your camera and soundtrack part way inside the mind. Not to mention the curious enhancements and dilations which the outside world takes on for a drunken man—and I don't mean distortions in any "artistic" or "fantastic" sense but only such qualities as withering, euphoria, and tumescence. In the aftermath of drunkenness one is liable to be excruciatingly oversensitive to things touched, and to sound, and to light. Touch would have had to be carried by business—and might surely have been used to convey feverishness as well. Sound and light peculiarities could have been impacted in the film and track by appropriate, dry exaggerations. A knocking radiator, an abrupt auto horn, coupled with the right kind of playing, might have told the audience as much in an instant as an hour of pure objectivity could. The light

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equivalents of flashing traffic on a sunny autumn day, as Birnam would experience them, might drive an audience moaning from the theater, unless their exact realism were modified into art.

I undershtand that liquor interesh: innerish: intereshtsh are rather worried about thish film. Thash tough.

Records

B. H. HAGGIN

THOUGH the sound of the Philadelphia orchestra in Columbia's most recently issued recordings has been clear and bright and natural, Columbia has not achieved the warmth and richness of Victor's recording of that orchestra—for example, the recording, made presumably before 1942, of its performance of Tchaikovsky's "Nutcracker" Suite under Ormandy (Set 1020; $3.50). The orchestra plays beautifully; Ormandy's treatment of the music has its normal quota of questionable tempos and prettifications.

This Philadelphia recording is an example of the type of Victor orchestral recording that I like best—in which everything is correctly placed in space and, as in the English recordings, cleanly defined in live but unreverberant quiet. Another example this month is the beautiful but—for me—saddening Dream Pantomime from "Hänsel und Gretel," well-performed by the National Symphony under Kindler (11-8948; $1).

The other type reproduces the reverberation of the empty hall, and at its best (the noisy confusion of the Boston Symphony's "Harold in Italy" is an example of its worst) achieves the somewhat hard clarity and brilliance of the sound of the Chicago Symphony's performance of Respighi's Suite "The Birds" under Defauw (Set SP-14; $2.25). The music is charming; the performance is very good; and again Victor charges $.25 for a useless "album."

The record of Waldteufel's "Skaters" Waltz (11-8947; $1) reproduces faithfully the hard, reverberant sound that N. B. C.'s Studio 8H gives to Toscanini's N. B. C. Symphony performances instead of the warmth and splendor of their sound in a normal concert hall. What Toscanini does with this Waldteufel piece is as astounding as what he does with Sousa marches: the plastic perfection of the modelling of the slow introduction brought tears to my eyes; and the grace and liveliness of the waltz were enchanting.

This is an example of the best that Victor has achieved in Studio 8H. There is also a worst: the harsh and coarse Mozart G minor, the cold and harsh Beethoven Fifth, the hard and excessively unresonant Beethoven "Eroica"; and to these Victor now adds a recording, made at the broadcast, of Toscanini's performance of Beethoven's Piano Concerto No. 3 with Rubinstein on October 29, 1944 (1016; $4.50). It gave Toscanini the opportunity it has given me to hear again the orchestral part played like Beethoven, the piano part played as if it were Chopin—for example, the florid melodic passage in thirds in the second movement played exactly as Rubinstein plays the florid passages in thirds in the second movement of Chopin's E minor Concerto—and to hear also the orchestra and piano badly out of gear for several measures after the cadenza in the first movement. Correctness of style and rhythmic precision are things which Toscanini is fanatical about; and I must therefore wonder at his approval of the performance for release. In addition, orchestra and piano are badly reproduced and their relative volumes of sound are often incorrect, so that occasionally piano figuration blankets orchestral melody, or an orchestra tutti that should burst in *fortissimo* sounds a mile away. Again, therefore, I must wonder that Toscanini and Victor should issue such a glaringly bad recording when they have withheld the 1941-42 recordings he made with the Philadelphia Orchestra because of defects that are very slight in comparison: an obscured oboe note at one point, a few clicks or a noisy surface at another point, which one would gladly put up with for the sake of the wonderful performances and the otherwise beautiful reproduction of their sound in the Academy of Music. If, in the case of the Beethoven concerto, it was decided that what Victor calls "slight mechanical imperfections" should not deprive "the world of music-lovers . . . [of] the thrill of hearing this great artistic triumph again and again," it should also be decided that the slighter imperfections should not deprive music-lovers of those memorable Philadelphia performances of Berlioz's "Queen Mab," Debussy's "La Mer," Schubert's C major, Tchaikovsky's "Pathétique."

The notes for Bach's "Goldberg" Variations played by Landowska (Set 1022; $6.50) quote excerpts from this passage in my review of her February, 1942, performance of the work in Town Hall: "Compared with the statement of the [opening] aria in the performance that Landowska put on records some years ago this one was more spaciously elaborated in greater detail—detail which was more richly inflected, now with power, now with subtlety, and always with extraordinary rhythmic continuity. These qualities of phrasing, together with masterly use of the instrument's tonal resources, imparted exciting life even to some of the more mechanical examples of the variation process that followed; and they made the spacious statements of the wonderful slow variations in minor mode, the affecting restatement of the aria at the end, overwhelming." The notes also quote Virgil Thomson's review of that performance, containing one of his discussions of rhythm about which there is always the same thing to say—that he may know what he is talking about but I haven't been able to find anyone else who does. However, he makes one observation, the truth of which I can appreciate: "Most artists, by the time they have worked out that much detail, are heartily sick of any piece and either walk through it half asleep or ham it up." By the time Victor recorded Landowska's performance, in June, 1945, she had hammed it up: the elaboration of detail had been pushed to the point where everything is over-blown, over-projected, overdramatized, where the shape of the phrase in those slow variations in minor is distorted, the rhythm obscured. Her instrument, in addition, is coarser in sound than the one she used for the old H. M. V. performance; and this difference is emphasized by the brighter Victor recording. The volume must be turned down far below the normal level to achieve the small sonority which the harpsichord should have; and even then there are a couple of sides from which the sound suddenly leaps out at you and fills the room with the chiming of bells.

James Melton sings *Il mio tesoro* from "Don Giovanni" (in Italian) and *Dies' Bildnis* from "Die Zauberflöte" (in English) with competence but with no refinement or vocal style or musical phrasing, in his volume of operatic arias (Set 1013; $3.50). The results are more acceptable in the Prize Song from "Die Meistersinger" and *"In fernem Land* from "Lohengrin" (both in German). There are also two arias from "Manon."

With one exception the Mozart Sonatas for organ and orchestra recorded by Biggs and the Fiedler Sinfonietta (Set 1019; $3.50) are inconsequential. The performances are good; their recorded sound reverberant and a little brash.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

To Our Readers

THE CHRISTMAS SPIRIT could not be more fittingly expressed in these troubled times than by gifts to organizations trying to relieve the destitution caused by the war. The agencies listed below are collecting clothing to aid those people in many parts of the world who are facing a winter of suffering. *The Nation* heartily commends them to your attention. Clothing may be sent to the addresses listed.

International Rescue and Relief Committee, 130 Orchard Street, New York 2.

United Yugoslav Relief Fund of America, 877 Broadway, New York 3.

American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, 235 East Eleventh Street, New York 3.

Foster Parents' Plan for War Children, Merchandise Receiving Depot, 991 First Avenue, New York 22.

Russian War Relief, 2331 Twelfth Avenue, New York.

Victory Clothing Collection, 100 Maiden Lane, New York 7.

American Friends Service Committee, Friends' Sewing Room, 144 East Twentieth Street, New York 11.

Spanish Refugee Appeal Warehouse, 715 Second Avenue, New York 16.

Untapped Reservoir

Dear Sirs: I was very much impressed with your recent editorial comment concerning the Spanish Refugee Appeal and its present clothing drive. So much so that it occurred to me that you might be interested in being reminded of a tremendous untapped reservoir which is expanding daily.

While the courageous heroes of Spain face the coming European winter with no real help apparently in sight, American demobilization is sending millions of men and women home equipped with a good deal of clothing which, in many cases, will see no, or almost no, service. From my own private observation it appears that the average G. I. hopes never to wear or use this equipment again, once he has made his initial adjustment and transformation into civilian life and apparel. The clothing includes warm overcoats, blouses, pants, shirts, woolen underclothes, socks, and possibly shoes. For all men already out of the service and those of us who will join them soon here is an opportunity for a worthy gesture to our predecessors in arms.

I feel certain that if we ex-service men and women were made fully cognizant of the great need, and of the debt owed these allies, we could provide a satisfying portion of the material needed by the Spanish Refugee Appeal.

ST.SG. HERBERT H. SEGERMAN

Indianapolis, December 2

Wonderland, 1945

Dear Sirs: "Everyone pities the Jews. Palestine must admit 100,000," said the Red Queen.

"And we must take the rest," said Alice.

"Well," said the Red Queen, "we might allow some to go to Philadelphia or Pittsburgh."

"Why these two?" said Alice.

"Both commence with P," said the Red Queen.

"And any left over can come to New York," said Alice.

"My dear," said the Red Queen, "certainly not! I live in New York."

JOHN BUCHANAN

Nova Scotia, December 6

The Gift of Song

Dear Sirs: The Music Library Committee of the American Friends of the Hebrew University, whose members include many distinguished music scholars, solicits music and books about music for the Hebrew University Library, Jerusalem, Palestine. Music in good condition, instrumental, chamber works, orchestral, and opera scores, vocal music, and books on all phases of music are sought.

The Music Section of the Hebrew University Library now possesses a considerable collection of music literature. But the great demand by students and music lovers in Palestine, Jews, Arabs, and Christians, alike, requires a greatly expanded collection.

Packages may be sent directly to the Hebrew University Library, Jerusalem, Palestine, or to the office of the American Friends of the Hebrew University, 10 East Fortieth Street, New York.

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New York, November 29

Dr. Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Editor*

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geophagy. The practice of eating earth. Clay is eaten by numerous poverty-stricken people in the tenant farm areas of Alabama and Georgia as a food substitute, primarily to make up for dietary deficiencies.

ahimsa. The doctrine of non-violence, as practised in India by Gandhi and his followers in their civil disobedience campaigns. The term includes all nonviolent forms of resistance, but excludes rioting, which often accompanies such campaigns.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 140

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 He beat Messala in a famous chariot race (two words, 3 & 3)
5 Tool of Fagin, and an artful dodger
10 Hero of John Bunyan's famous allegory
11 Heaven's first law, according to Pope
12 Arrange
13 Metal plate for marking a crate
14 Athenodorus advised Caesar to repeat the alphabet to himself when he was this
16 A hat, Polly, is one way to make you feel better
18 "Keystones" is probably a better word for them
20 It might be worse
22 They give people nasty looks
24 Composer whose *Americana* suite is more frequently heard abroad than here
26 All that was left of the Cheshire Cat
27 The gloomy poet in *Patience*
28 Entertainment provided by a boy and an insect
29 By no means a sedentary profession

DOWN

2 Husbands of countesses
3 What we learn at school is conservative for the most part
4 A pity, in the sequel, that Eve troubled to make such a fuss (two words, 5 & 4)
5 Headless patron saint of France
6 Praised a thing in writing—overpraised it a little, perhaps (two words, 5 & 2)
7 Points to there being at least one household pet in the Indies
8 Makes Rhys ill when disordered
9 Longfellow makes it the subject of his poem, *Evangeline*
15 Fluting puts back horse-power into Goering
17 Ancient name for Portugal
18 Summons on the telephone? (two words, 5 & 2)
19 This girl starts to say something
20 Take what comes (two words, 5 & 2)
21 The thing is to spot him before he is
23 Say, bo, this is some footwear!
25 Nothing in the barn? Might be a bit of beef

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 139

ACROSS:—1 THURBER; 5 ALBANIA; 9 BENISON; 10 ARBUTUS; 11 GUM; 13 CORDED; 15 MOROSE; 16 DAUPHIN; 17 OWED; 19 SKYE; 20 UNDERSELL; 21 MAIN; 23 YARD; 26 RETAILS; 28 DOCTOR; 29 YUM-YUM; 30 EEL; 32 COSTARD; 33 IMPRINT; 34 MADISON; 35 PORTEND.

DOWN:—1 TOBACCO; 2 UNNERVE; 3 BASHED; 4 RUNG; 5 ADAM; 6 BABOON; 7 NETWORK; 8 AUSTERE; 12 UPPER CASE; 14 DAWDLER; 15 MISERLY; 18 DUN; 19 SLY; 21 MODICUM; 22 INCISED; 24 ANY TIME; 25 DEMOTED; 26 ROMANS; 27 SUPPER; 30 EDEN; 31 LIMP.

The NATION

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THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 161 NEW YORK • SATURDAY • DECEMBER 22, 1945 NUMBER 25, PART 2

I. IS SECURITY POSSIBLE?

Introductory Note

The addresses in this supplement were delivered at the four regular sessions and the dinner which comprised the three-day forum on "The Challenge of the Atomic Bomb" conducted by the Nation Associates at the Hotel Astor in New York on December 1, 2, and 3. The editors have tried to give as complete a resume as possible of the material presented at the forum. Space limitations have, however, necessitated condensation and deletion which we regret. The discussion from the floor could not be reproduced even in part, although it was of high quality and contributed greatly to the interest and value of the proceedings. We want to take this opportunity to thank all the participants, active and passive, for their help in making the forum a success; and to inform our readers that mimeographed copies of the complete texts of addresses are available in limited numbers.—EDITORS THE NATION.

The Pattern of Destruction

BY HENRY DEWOLF SMYTH
Chairman, Department of Physics, Princeton University

ANYONE who has been associated with the Manhattan Project for five years must believe that anything is possible. I am not willing to say that there cannot be any military defense against the atomic bomb, but I do not at present see any likelihood of an *adequate* military defense.

Atomic weapons put a high premium on surprise attack. Defense against such an attack therefore becomes the problem of maintaining in peace time for twenty-four hours of every day, year in and year out, a system of radar networks covering this entire country, together with constantly alert anti-aircraft and fighter-plane defense. The cost of such a system of defense both in terms of taxes and of implications for our attitude as a nation makes it an expensive program in every sense of the word. Even if it were attempted, I doubt that it could possibly be completely effective. It has been said recently that we could develop a system for exploding atomic bombs at a distance before they reach this country, even if they come as rockets or jet-propelled planes. To evaluate such a statement, it is necessary to consider what has already been published about the nature of the atomic bomb.

The atomic bomb depends for its power on a neutron chain reaction in U-235 or in plutonium. The nature of this reaction is such that it cannot take place in less than a certain amount of the material, known as the critical size. In other words, if we have less than the critical size of U-235 or of plutonium, an atomic explosion cannot occur. If, on the other hand, we have more than the critical size, there will always be some neutrons present from cosmic rays and these neutrons will suffice to start a chain reaction. Thus, for less than the critical amounts of atomic explosive it is impossible to start an explosion; for more than the critical amounts it is impossible to prevent an explosion. No official statement has been made of what the critical amount of plutonium or U-235 is, but an early estimate has been published which indicates that for U-235 the critical amount is between 5 and 250 pounds. No official statements have been published as to just how the atomic bombs that we have used operate, but evidently they are detonated by the sudden bringing together of subcritical amounts of the explosive material.

These facts have a bearing on the statement that atomic bombs could be exploded at a distance. Such an explosion is obviously impossible by any direct action on the explosive material in the bomb itself. To set off the explosion when desired, any action must be indirect and would have to be on fuses or other auxiliary equipment in the bomb. Thus, the problem becomes exactly similar to the problem of exploding any other kind of bomb at a distance. We are forced back, therefore, on the methods used for ordinary bombs or for the German V-1 or V-2 bombs. It was possible to destroy many V-1 bombs by firing at them shells aimed by radar control and containing proximity fuses, because the V-1 bombs flew at low altitudes and at relatively low velocities. So far as I know, no defense was successful against V-2 bombs. The nature of the atomic bomb and the speed of its approach make it highly questionable that any anti-aircraft or other defense can be developed against it which will be one hundred per cent effective. Some atomic bombs would inevitably get through, and it would need only a few atomic bombs penetrating the defense to cause destruction. It is perhaps conceivable that we might develop some sort of counter-weapon against atomic bombs carried in V-2 projectiles. I confess that at present the problem of developing effectively

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such counter-weapons seems to me impossibly difficult.

There is an incidental point here which may be of interest, although it is not directly concerned with defense. Since rocket bombs might be sent in a few moments from any spot on earth to any other spot, it could well prove impossible, in the event of an attack by atomic bombs, to know from which country the attack had come.

The atomic age has made possible still another method of surprise attack. There is no scientific reason why atomic bombs cannot be shipped in trunks or boxes in peace time to key industrial and population centers, and detonated at the moment desired by remote control wireless or other means. Atomic bombs last for a long time after they are made, and can be stored or hidden with slight possibility of detection. As we know from the facts about them which have already been published, they do not explode until properly detonated. Against such secretly planted atomic bombs the only conceivable defense would be an elaborate peace-time system of coast and frontier guards, and continuous X-ray inspection of every item of freight or baggage coming into this country. I do not believe such a permanent defense system could be maintained with anything near complete effectiveness. But even if it could be maintained, its implications would certainly make much more difficult our peace-time relations with other countries.

There have been various methods suggested for defense against atomic bombs on the international level. These are chiefly police methods of inspection and control. It seems to me too early to pass judgment upon such methods, which have not yet been clearly outlined. I would only comment in passing that history has shown us that police methods, however necessary, are never more than a partial and imperfect solution for social unrest.

The atomic age is here. War in this age would almost surely mean surprise attack. Defense against such attack along the lines I have indicated might be possible with vast expenditure, great and sustained effort, and in the open atmosphere of international suspicion. Such defense measures could never, in my opinion, be completely effective. Our best possibility for survival in an atomic war would be to have our industries and population dispersed, many of our factories and bomb plants underground, and launching platforms for atomic rockets located throughout the country so that in the event of attack we would retaliate, even though our cities and industries were largely annihilated.

There is still one other alternative for defense against the atomic bomb. It is to build with our fellow-nations a world in which there is no need to resort to war.

On the question of the value of secrecy, I would like to point out only one or two aspects.

The fundamental principles on which the atomic bomb is based were well known to scientists everywhere by 1939. There are at present two categories of secrecy about atomic energy maintained by this government. One category consists of technical tricks of manufacture and final assembly of the bomb itself. The second category consists of a mass of information, acquired in the last five years, about artificial radioactivity, the biological effects of radiation, and other scientific topics bearing only indirectly on the production of atomic bombs. I do not believe we should release at present the first category of secret information, that is, the technical tricks of making the bomb. To be sure, any industrial nation can learn these tricks for itself within a few years and probably improve on them. But I do not see why hurriedly showing other nations how to make bombs is going to further world peace. I believe the information we now have on how to make atomic bombs should be released only to an international agency able to maintain control of them. But I do believe we should release a great part of the second category of secret information, that is, the information on nuclear energy acquired in the last five years and not directly concerned with making atomic bombs. This information would be of the greatest value to such sciences as medicine and biology and to engineering and industry generally. It is absolutely essential for further developments in physics and chemistry. To keep this information secret any longer is to retard seriously our development in many fields. If we release it nationally and internationally, we would evidence our intention to cooperate fully with our fellow nations and to return to that free interchange of ideas which is the tradition and strength of science and of the whole field of thought.

The most important technical resource of a nation is neither raw materials nor equipment, but educated men. Obviously we will need an increasing supply of such men in the post-war period. Under war-time policy the training of such men practically stopped. The policy of the Selective Service has made students in the sciences almost non-existent. The resumption of training must be encouraged in every possible way. The scientific men from the universities on the war-time projects should be returned as soon as possible to their normal activities of teaching and research. The welfare and safety of this country can be assured only by leaving them free to pass on what they have learned to a new generation of educated and trained men. If we lock our scientists up in secret laboratories, neither they nor the country will develop. The free interchange of ideas, nationally and internationally, is the strength of science, as indeed it is of every other department of men's lives.

Ideas are a common inheritance from thoughtful men in all countries and all civilizations. To speak of continued secrecy in the field of thought and discovery is to deny our moral birthright and the very tradition which has brought us this far from savagery. Secrecy in any field in peace time is fatal to man's growth and to any hope for a world society.

FORUM PROGRAM

I. IS SECURITY POSSIBLE?
December 1, 9:30 A. M. Presiding: Freda Kirchwey

II. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BOMB
December 1, 2 P. M. Presiding: Freda Kirchwey

III. ATOMS AND INDUSTRY
December 2, 9 A. M. Presiding: J. King Gordon

IV. THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL
December 2, 2 P. M. Presiding: Edgar A. Mowrer

V. DINNER FORUM
December 3, 6:30 P. M. Presiding: Leon Henderson

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Facts About Defense

BY IVAN A. GETTING
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; consultant for War Department

MY ROLE in this war was in developing those parts of radar applications which had to do with anti-aircraft control, with the guidance of strategic and tactical bomber missions, with the use of radar in directing buzz-bombs and other types of guided missiles. I appeal to this experience in presenting my arguments because obviously I cannot go into all the technical details, all the figures and theories and scientific knowledge which are required to arrive at some of the statements I shall make.

The problem of a defense against any weapon can be divided into two main parts. Let us consider explosives, regardless of whether they are atomic explosives or something mild like the usual high explosive. The first part of the problem is to prevent the enemy from putting the explosive where he wishes to put it. The other is what you do at the place where you expect the explosive to be put.

In the first case, you do everything possible to keep the enemy from finding out where to put the explosive and from arriving at the spot—you mislead him, jam his radar, ruin his communication, and so forth. In the second case, you try to protect yourself bodily from the explosive itself. This you do by scattering, going underground, building huge concrete structures, and by many other methods.

Considering this problem in terms of atomic explosives, we must ask, first: What is the probability that from a technical standpoint we can effectively prevent the enemy from getting the explosives to our front door? The use of the parcel-post or of trunks as conveyors of atomic explosives is not a matter on which scientific opinion is of any particular value. Your opinion is as good as mine. But on the question of delivering explosives by means of long-range rockets, V-2's, airplanes, guided ships, and such things, I believe I have something to contribute.

We developed during the war several navigation systems which depend on radio and radar. Some of these systems will be adopted after the war for commercial use. The whole world will soon be covered by a radio network which will make it possible to navigate an airplane or navigate a ship from any point on the earth to any other point well within the accuracy of about one mile. This means that any potential enemy is provided with an automatic way of delivering atomic bombs by conventional aircraft using conventional auto-pilots with a conventional "Loran" receiver —that is the code name of this system. We need not wait for those rockets which fly from one side of the earth to the other. Today, with existing equipment, existing bombs, existing aircraft, existing navigational aids, we can already fly from any one part of the world to any other without a single human operator in the aircraft.

You may say that when the war breaks out we can just turn off these "Loran" stations. You may, but the enemy may not. It is a simple thing for him to set up his own system, which he turns on after the first night, because on the first night he certainly can use our system, the international "Loran" system. It is perfectly possible for the enemy to set up at remote places of the earth or in the middle of the ocean, by means of submarine or other types of ships, radio light-houses which will guide the normal aircraft on its mission. I will admit, as an expert on anti-aircraft and on radar and on gunnery, that we could shoot these planes down. However, we must consider the frailty of human beings. In the defense of London against the buzz-bomb, the British Army deployed three hundred batteries of heavy anti-aircraft guns. These batteries were equipped with the most modern radar developed in the radiation laboratory, with computers developed by a well-known laboratory here in New York, and with American and British guns. It is true that after six weeks we were shooting down over 90 per cent of the buzz-bombs. Only eight per day arrived in London. However, in the first few weeks over 40 per cent got through. It took constant drill, exercise, education, practice with real live bait before the efficiency of the troops had risen to 90 per cent from the original 60 per cent.

It was very lucky for us that the buzz-bomb was a well behaved airplane. It flew in straight lines, at a constant speed, and that is just what we like in anti-aircraft. If the Germans had had any sense they would have forced these missiles to fly in curved, jerky courses, and this could be done. They also would have added what we were adding at the radiation laboratory, radar remote control by which a man sitting back in Paris could have guided these things by a little joy-stick in front of automatic plotting equipment and brought the buzz-bomb to the correct site on any type of course he desired.

Ivan A. Getting

So it is true London was saved from TNT by modern anti-aircraft—but let us look at the obvious. If any of those eight buzz-bombs that arrived in London each day had had a ton load of the type of bomb we used in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, London would not have been saved.

Now it was fortunate that we had three hundred batteries in England. It was fortunate that the buzz-bomb was so close to the conventional aircraft. Suppose that the buzz-bomb had been a new device? How long would it have taken us to get ready for it? It takes from a year to five years to develop a military weapon; even after you know just how to go about it. It takes six months to a year to train troops and then another space of time to get the equipment into the field with spare-part depots in the right places.

So, we must accept the fact that if the enemy develops a new way of bringing atomic bombs to our doorstep, and if it happens that no one was smart enough to have thought up, one to five years ahead of time, a defense weapon with which to stop that particular missile, then we can do nothing about it except take the punishment, if we can. Take as a small example the V-2 bomb. The same radar

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that was used against the buzz-bomb was also used to track the V-2. It was my group at the laboratory which had developed the SCR-584. They were my boys who in Belgium and England were putting this equipment to proper use. Now we could pick up the V-2's by radar. We could track them, provided we were located in a reasonable position. We could tell within two or three city blocks where the V-2's were going to land. *We could not stop them.* The V-2 lent itself to almost no method of successful counter-defense. Any missile which is designed for speeds above the velocity of sound is tapered with such a sharp nose that, hit head-on by radar, it is the best camouflage target you could design. The radar energy is scattered in all directions and none of it comes back to you. You cannot see the V-2 with radar except from the flank. It is true, of course, that enough radar stations placed up and down the coast could provide data as to where the V-2's were heading. And if these data were sufficiently accurate, it would be presumably possible to send your own missiles into the air and meet these V-2's; but here again there are many problems.

A V-2 is a steel structure. It can be armored. It is moving very rapidly—six times as fast as sound—so that anything that strikes it will in truth be itself struck head-on at a glancing angle; under these circumstances the effective strength of the steel will be much greater than that of any ordinary missile which can be sent against it. There is no way to stop V-2's except by disintegrating them or by actually colliding with them with a mass approximately their own size. In making a study of this problem for the United States Army, I could not find any hopeful way—nor could my colleagues find any way; nor could the British find any way—to stop them; and this is a matter of military record. The V-2 is simply one device. Given a little time, I am sure every scientist and engineer in this country can dream up other methods of delivering atomic explosives. And while I believe that, if you gave me enough money and enough men, I might be able eventually to shoot down a V-2, I will never guarantee to shoot down any new thing that you may think up. Since the aggressor, in the next war, will have the advantage of surprise, I will still have to beg for from one to five years to develop a defense (assuming that I know how) against new ways of delivering atomic explosive.

The atomic bomb has introduced one chief new element into the problem of defense, and that is its tremendous intensity. In the last war of the previous era—now just behind us—if we shot down from 5 to 10 per cent of the German planes, or if the Germans shot down from 5 to 10 per cent of our planes, the morale of the pilots cracked. It was possible then to say that anti-aircraft was a very important defensive weapon because it was able to destroy more than 5 to 10 per cent of the German planes that came over. But 5 to 10 per cent losses did not demoralize the buzz-bombs. Nor did 90 per cent demoralize them; it just increased the cost to the Germans. Atomic explosives demand not 90 per cent, but 100 per cent defense. This, we do not know how to achieve.

The conclusion to which we are driven, as men experienced in designing equipment and seeing it put into the field, is that there is no adequate defense possible against atomic explosives when the enemy has a free choice of all the possible technical ways of delivering such explosives.

Cooperation is the Key

BY VICTOR WEISSKOPF
University of Rochester; member of Association of Los Alamos Scientists

THE problem of international control of the bomb is a political one, not a scientific one. The question as to whether control is technically feasible is misleading. Of course if you have access to *all* production facilities you can find out where a bomb is made. If, however, a country is resolved to deceive the world, it will be able to do so. One can probably fabricate bombs underground and avoid any radio-activity to penetrate to the outside. It will be expensive, but it is a soluble problem. If a country is out to break the rules, no control system is sufficient.

It should not follow from this that goodwill among nations alone is sufficient. Control is necessary to establish confidence, especially if it makes a circumvention of the agreement difficult, and if special effort and elaborate deceit have to be used to break the agreement.

There are a few points in the character of our problem that make a partial control more efficient than it seems at first glance. The personnel that has to be used for atomic bomb development is very specialized and limited in numbers. The key nuclear scientists are well known. The industrial methods are completely different from those in any other production, and are easily recognizable if no specially great effort is put into camouflage.

It seems, therefore, that measures which may appear weak and insufficient have a chance to go further than one may think. For example, if the pre-war collaboration between scientists is reestablished, and if scientists are encouraged by their own governments to exchange scientific views and results in frequent international meetings, then it would be hard to have the key nuclear physicists in one country work on atomic-bomb development without arousing the strong suspicion of their colleagues in other countries. The problems in modern physics are new and hard and they need concentrated effort. The atomic bomb will not be developed successfully by scientists unknown to the rest of the world.

A more radical step would be to have experienced scientists work as guests for long periods in foreign countries. It would be difficult for a country to use well-known men and equipment for illegal purposes without arousing the suspicions of visiting scientists, especially if the latter were in close touch with the educational institutions and laboratories.

Finally, if the nations consent to have a commission visit any factory they please, extreme caution and expense would be necessary to hide production or development.

One condition of successful international control is successful national control. It is obvious that national legislation must be strong enough to insure that no nuclear research or technological development could be carried on in secrecy, unknown to the government.

International control, however, can succeed only if it is introduced not in the spirit of mutual distrust but in the spirit of mutual reassurance within the frame of a basically well-defined policy.

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II. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BOMB

The Weapons of Peace

BY HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS
Member of Congress from California

WHAT is our real attitude toward the Soviet Union? I don't think we know. I don't think we have thought it out.

I know what it appears to be to one of our fighting men still in the Pacific. I have a letter written by a 19-year-old Texas boy. He volunteered for enlistment in the navy before he was through high school—not because he had any illusions about the "glory" of war, but because he felt there was a job to be done. His letter was dated November 11, 1945—Armistice Day. He wrote:

> They have just sent the mailman over to the FPO, which is a landing ship tank. I hope there are some letters and packages for me. It is getting hard to write, not knowing what is going on back there. I might as well tell you now there hasn't been any change out here. Everything is just as SNAFU as ever. In fact, it seems that, instead of getting faster with the discharging, they are getting slower.
>
> Well, Miss, I hope you are having a grand time and enjoying the peace. From what I hear over the radio, it isn't going to last much longer. I guess *we* will start a fight with Russia. From the things we say and write and preach about them, they should be ready to fight now. Every time I hear a news broadcast or read a newspaper, some loudmouth is slamming Russia.
>
> Why in hell, don't we stop screaming about who owes who and try to *help* Russia? I have talked with men who were in Russia during the war. They say the Russians don't want to fight us; they don't want anything to do with us. All they want is to help their own people, build up their country, better themselves. If we had the sense of a jackass, we'd do the same.
>
> One thing I always had faith in was our Government. Even that is gone.

The American people are a peace-loving people. Except for an hour of parade here and there, they don't like gold braid and martial music in their lives. Peace is our foreign policy. Peace is our most profound desire. But we cannot have peace by just wishing for it.

There are weapons of peace just as there are weapons of war. The most powerful weapon for peace is friendship. Franklin Roosevelt understood this. That is why, when he first came to the office of President, he began to cement the bonds of friendship in this hemisphere. That is why he called for collective security in 1935. That is why, under his leadership, throughout the war, we continuously moved toward the building of world understanding and cooperation, because these are the very few foundations of peace. Even in the darkest days of war, when we were running the scientific race of all time, he sought to strengthen our bonds of friendship with Great Britain and Russia.

Why? The reasons are clear enough: No single country can keep the peace alone. To maintain and build the peace, it is necessary to develop, maintain, and strengthen the solidarity of the United Nations Organization. There is no United Nations Organization unless the Big Five stay together. The core of the Big Five is formed by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. These are the three most powerful nations in the world—the only three nations which can in themselves win a war or win a peace. If any one of these three nations falls out, there is no practical likelihood of the United Nations working.

Helen Gahagan Douglas

It is an agony to watch our fears separate us from our future, an agony to watch certain forces play upon those fears, to watch them label as "anti-American" those of us who merely face the facts and point out that, if there is to be peace, it must begin with the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. We are not pro-Russia or pro-Britain. We are pro-man. We are pro-life—not pro-death. For in the new world into which we have been blown by forces of the universe which we have let loose, there are no boundaries. There are really no differences in tongues. There are just people—black people, white people, yellow people, Russians, Americans, English, French, Chinese, Hungarians, Greeks, Germans, Slavs. And our future is indivisible.

I don't believe we really hate Russia. I don't think we are driven on by a relentless passion to go to war with Russia. We got along all right with Russia before the war—and we got along with her during the war. We can live together again in peace. But there is a nameless fear we have never analyzed. Is Russia our natural enemy? Is it a belligerent nation, a nation bent upon domination of the earth by force of arms, as Germany was? Is this the root of our suspicion? I don't think so. An examination of the facts does not bear this out. Not when we remember that Russia stood for international disarmament, advocated this in the League of Nations, backed President Roosevelt's program of collective security, urged honest non-intervention in Spain, warned against the aggressiveness of Germany, and wanted to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia even though Russia was kept out of the Munich Conference.

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Why should Russia want to go to war? It has all the land it needs—one-sixth of the globe. It is rich with people—rich with natural resources. What Russia needs is peace and the kind of security in the world that will enable it to put its resources and energies into a peace-time program for its people. Moreover, Russia has paid a terrible price in this war. Ten million dead, millions more wounded, cities destroyed, factories demolished, fields and farms devastated.

Do we fear Russia economically? No, we welcome the markets she offers us.

Then what is this fear? Is it a fear which grows out of the anxiety which was born of the Russian Revolution, an anxiety that our own economic free-enterprise system is somehow endangered? But if we take this fear out and examine it from all sides, we find that it dissolves, for there is no basis in fact for antagonism between ourselves and this great sister nation. Those who have this fear have themselves little confidence in our economy and in our ability to realize goals of human happiness for our people.

The idea of apprehension or anxiety or fear among the people of a nation as powerful as the United States is utterly preposterous.

If we set for ourselves here at home, along with the goal of international peace, a goal of full employment and prosperity and really fight to win these objectives, we shall at the same time be an example to the world which will win for us not only friendship and cooperation, but a belief in our way of doing things. We can win this kind of friendship only through example—never through force.

The Heritage of All

BY M. J. COLDWELL

Member of the Canadian Parliament

As a Canadian, I am deeply interested in the relationship between the United States and Russia, for Canada is the country which lies in between them. In the event of difficulty, Canada would be the cockpit of North America. Then, too, Canada is the source of the material that made possible the discovery and production of atomic energy. We have in our country El Dorado, the mine from which uranium is at the moment being produced.

To me as a layman, the discovery of the secret of atomic energy seems comparable to man's discovery of the use of fire or the wheel long ages ago. This discovery means a revolution in man's way of life, so fundamental that we can scarcely conceive it. There is no doubt that, with the information available to the leading scientists throughout the world, its utilization for human needs is in immediate prospect. Attempts to divide the nations into two groups—those in possession of the knowledge and those without it—are bound to fail. It is against the interests of human progress and of universal peace to try to hide this knowledge.

This afternoon we have heard proposals for the sharing of this knowledge with Russia, which would place it among four nations—three powerful and large nations and one smaller nation—my own country, which we sometimes speak of as a middle power. Speaking as a representative of a little power, or a small nation, I do not believe that the sharing of this knowledge among a few nations is good enough. It must be the heritage of all nations, not a few.

Therefore, obviously, at the moment the body to which the control should be given is the United Nations Organization, which is about to be set up. Until government at the international level is evolved, only UNO can prevent the atomic bomb from remaining what in fact it has become during the past four months—a divisive influence among the nations of the world.

As early as August 18, 1945, when speaking in Toronto, I made a strong plea for placing this revolutionary discovery under the Assembly of the United Nations, not under the Security Council. I was speaking for one of the smaller nations. We do not like the veto power. This could be done without amending the charter by establishing under one of its principal organs—the Social and Economic Council—a new specialized agency consisting of the leading scientists of the world, who would be charged with the exchange of information, continued research, and such recommendations as may be necessary for the intelligent use of atomic power. Reporting as it does to the General Assembly, the Social and Economic Council could thus make available to all members of the United Nations the specialized opinions of the world's foremost scientists.

By making the discovery available to all nations, great and small, Russia and France, Yugoslavia and other nations, the objections raised by the middle and small powers to the domination of the world by two or three large powers, would to some extent be removed and the danger of the continuance of power politics minimized.

Canada assisted materially in the discovery, and is the present source of uranium—the mineral which provided the basis for the splitting of the atom. But it is certain that, once split, atoms of various elements can also be split and uranium may not long remain the basic element required for atomic energy. This being so, it makes the consideration of the question of international and public control of atomic research a matter of primary importance.

We cannot allow this revolutionary discovery to be controlled by private industry. Its implications are too vast and too dangerous. We know from bitter experience that "big business" in all our countries observes no national loyalties or human ethics where profits are concerned. We have seen how this desire for profits by giant monopolies and through international cartels has caused secret agreements, jeopardizing the welfare and security of all the people throughout the world, written largely in your own *Congressional Record*, written in your own documents, tabled in our Parliament, regarding the operations of monopolies and cartels before and during this war. Yet atomic research is largely in the hands of du Pont in the United States, Imperial Chemical Industries in the United Kingdom, and their creature—Canadian Industries Limited in Canada.

This is a highly improper and dangerous situation. The countries concerned should remove the members of the chemical cartel from the control of research and atomic energy and establish publicly owned organizations to carry on these important functions.

It is essential that atomic research should be on an international level. Its results and benefits should be utilized *only*

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for the good of mankind. Government ownership of facilities and control of research is necessary to prevent powerful and unscrupulous private interests from utilizing the principle of atomic energy for their own ends.

Only in this way can we insure that the work will be directed to peaceful purposes and needs. The world cannot afford to allow secret experimentation which has for its purpose the development of increased atomic killing power. The small nations of the world must insist that this most dangerous armament race in history shall be prevented. A thoroughly awakened and aroused labor movement could play a vital role in this regard.

A consciousness of the implications of atomic energy would enable organized labor to demand that workers employed on the project should work only in properly government-owned and internationally-inspected plants. Together with organized scientific workers labor could oppose any attempts to carry on unauthorized and secret work in this connection.

A fully aroused public opinion, demanding government control of the facilities and the international exchange of information, could make it possible to harness atomic energy for the good of the world. The danger of the present policy is that it may be used as political blackmail through the ever-present threats of war.

Share and Share Alike

BY WALTER MILLIS
Editorial writer, New York Herald Tribune

I THINK we should recognize from the outset that the political problem of the atomic bomb *is* the problem, for the present period at any rate, of our relations with the Soviet Union; and conversely, that the problem of our relations with the Soviet Union has to an unhappy degree become the problem of the atomic bomb.

It seems to me useless to discuss the one except in the direct, explicit context of the other. It seems to me perfectly idle (though no doubt diplomatically necessary) for President Truman or Prime Minister Attlee to speak in a generalized way about publishing the technical secrets of the bomb when it is abundantly clear that the only nation at present in a position to make use of those secrets is the Soviet Union. That is what nine-tenths of the argument has been about, and I believe the time has come to admit it frankly.

That is why I am glad that the agenda of this conference starkly puts the question of whether the secrets of the bomb should be given to Russia.

My own answer to the question is unhesitating. I think we should immediately offer full publication of our own technical data in return for a reasonable reciprocity on Russia's part in the publication of its scientific and technical material. That is the only proviso I would attach to the offer. In advancing it, however, I would point to the many obvious dangers latent in the unregulated development of atomic energy and would request Russia's assistance and counsel in devising an adequate structure of international control.

It may be said that this is, in essence, what the Truman-Attlee communiqué proposes. I cannot agree. I don't think that the Russians agree. The communiqué expressly reserves the vital technical data. To be sure, the United Nations Organization is to be asked to set up a commission, charged with the formidable task of answering all the innumerable questions—political as well as technical and military—which Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee and Mr. King left unanswered in their somewhat hurried conference between airplanes. But while the commission pursues its labors, the United States will not only retain all the technical knowledge but will go right ahead manufacturing bombs, as it is continuing to do. When, as, and if the commission has produced a solution satisfactory to all—which, under the circumstances, means satisfactory to the United States—the data will be generally published. So far, Moscow has failed to greet this proposal with the enthusiastic acquiescence which was apparently anticipated. I, for one, am not surprised.

I think President Truman made a tragic mistake when he failed to realize, from the very first moment, the crucial identity between the problems of atomic energy and the problem of Russia. The appalling military terrors implicit in the bomb absolutely demanded a firm settlement of political differences between Russia and the West. It seems to me it might not have been wholly beyond the powers of statesmanship to use the technical discovery for the constructive adjustment of the political issues. Let us glance back at what was actually done.

At Potsdam Mr. Stalin was apparently given only a most guarded and grudging disclosure of the fact that a test bomb had been successfully fired in New Mexico. When the time came for the military use of the bomb, no Russian observers were, so far as I know, invited to be present in order that they could at least judge its potency for themselves. The discharge of the bomb at Hiroshima was, however, immediately announced to the world in a blaze of extravagant official publicity, all built around two ideas: that the United States had developed (with some little assistance from Britain, Canada, and a bunch of dreamy foreign scientists) an invention absolutely decisive in war and revolutionary in peace; and that the magic "secret" of this staggering achievement was and would be guarded from everyone under the most extreme restrictions of top-secret security. Perhaps this publicity was inevitable; for it was, after all, an extravagant moment in world history. I ask you only to consider the sort of impact it must have had upon our Russian allies, who were at that moment loyally preparing to fulfil to the letter their commitment to give Japan the *coup de grâce*. The fact is, at any rate, that from that moment our relations with Soviet Russia have steadily deteriorated.

After the official publicity there came the private outgivings, the statements of Congressmen, the savage May-Johnson bill. Through all this the idea rose ever more prominently, expressed under increasingly transparent veils, that whatever we did we could not give "the secret" to the Russians. We distrusted the purposes, aims, and colossal power of the Soviet Union too deeply. How much this did to inspire the Russians with trust in our own purposes may be guessed. Perhaps it may be seen more directly in the catastrophic breakdown of the Foreign Ministers' Conference.

Finally, there was President Truman's disastrous statement that the technical secrets would be given to no one, and that

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anyhow no other nation in the world had the knowledge, resources, or skills to discover them for itself over a period of many years. Even then, when the muddle was about as complete as it could be made, it required Mr. Attlee's initiative to induce our government to do something about it. The result is the communiqué to which I have referred.

I ask you to try for a moment to reverse this history. Supposing that it had been the Russians, and not ourselves, who had exploded this thing at Hiroshima just as our naval and air forces believed that they themselves were knocking Japan cold. Supposing that Mr. Stalin had announced that the secrets of the staggering discovery would be given to nobody, that anyway only a nation with Russia's vast resources and totalitarian economic organization could produce a bomb, and that it would take many years for the backward and chaotic capitalist democracies to catch up, if ever. I think the reaction in this country would have been both violent and unfortunate. Suppose that Mr. Stalin, confronted with that reaction, had rather belatedly proposed that the UNO set up a commission on the matter, with a tentative promise that when the commission had worked out an international control system satisfactory to Soviet Russia, the secrets would be imparted to it, but that meanwhile the Soviet Union would go right ahead manufacturing bombs for "test purposes." I think we would have regarded those "test" bombs with a fierce suspicion. I think we would have seen at once that the commission, in working out a regulatory system satisfactory to Russia, would all but inevitably find itself involved in most of the political issues that at present divide us. It would have to decide them, too, in a manner satisfactory to Russia. I think we would have regarded the whole thing as a Communist trap. I think that we—with our unbounded, war-bred confidence in the power of our technology, comparable to that which the Russians feel in theirs—would have decided that the easier course would be to get busy at once and develop our own atomic bombs. It might take us some years, but we would know that we could count on a decade or so of substantial peace. We would calculate that when we had our bombs ready we could go back to the Russians on an equal footing and so get a genuinely agreed and rational solution of the control problem.

That, I think, would have been our decision. And that, I think, is the Russian decision. I suspect that the one most significant thing that has been said about the atomic bomb since the initial announcement was the brief paragraph in Mr. Molotov's anniversary speech announcing simply that Russia "will have atomic energy, too." I think that Russia means to have it; that she can probably—as Dr. Urey pointed out the other day—develop the leads she has already obtained more quickly than we can in time of peace, and that she will have atomic energy in a military form within a few years.

The resultant situation is well-calculated to breed distrust on both sides, to exacerbate all political issues between the two countries, and to drive both Russian and American diplomacy to extremes. And by the time the Soviet Union has amassed its own stock of atomic bombs and is ready to come back and talk control on equal terms, the whole problem may have got out of hand, and it may be too late for any solution. Meanwhile, the situation is also calculated to cripple the non-military development of atomic energy and nuclear research in general. In our passion for "security" we are threatening finally to disrupt that marvelous and creative "international of science" which is responsible for all our technical triumphs. Our own nuclear research workers have just protested MacArthur's destruction of the Japanese cyclotrons, comparing the act to the Nazi book-burnings. There, I think, is a notion which should give us pause.

All this is the result of the policy of "keeping the secrets." It is late now to reverse the policy. It may take us a long time to undo the damage which has already been done. But I believe the policy should be reversed. I don't believe we can afford to wait on the United Nations Organization. I think this country should immediately take the initiative with a policy based not on keeping the secrets but on pooling the secrets—all of them. This then would mean that the military and non-military secrets of Russian technology as well as those of our own would be in a common pool.

For Russia has secrets too. It is no use blinking the fact that the extreme secretiveness of the Soviet Union, in technical, cultural, and political as well as military matters, is a major factor in this whole business and one of the most unfortunate elements in the contemporary international world. By sitting now upon our own store of secrets concerning the overwhelmingly important development of nuclear energy, we are simply compounding and encouraging this Russian tendency. We are promoting a general drift backward into nationalistic compartmentation in almost the only great field in which a genuine and constructive internationalism has survived—that of technical advance and scientific investigation.

It seems to me that our present possession of the so-called atomic secrets could be used now, not to promote this tendency but to arrest and reverse it. I think we can make a full and frank offer to pool with the world the great mass of knowledge and data we have accumulated, and that with this offer in our hand we can then ask a similar frankness from the Soviet Union and all other great powers in the publication of both general technological and specifically military development. If we meet with refusal, that will, of course, create a new situation. But we have not tried yet. If we try and succeed, I think we shall then have laid the first absolutely necessary foundation for a working international control of the atomic horror—which is frankness, confidence, and above all knowledge.

What I propose seems to me the one constructive political use that can be made of our present possession of the bomb. I do not think that we can browbeat the Soviet Union into conforming with our wishes by using the bomb as a threat—especially when Moscow knows perfectly well that the people of the United States are not in fact going to launch an atomic war upon Russia in any proximate future. I do believe that we can use an offer of our present knowledge as proof of goodwill and a means of securing Russia's powerful aid in dealing with what is in fact a problem of humanity. To take the attitude that we will do nothing until the rest of the world has solved the problem for us means only that our stock of bombs and our knowledge of how to make them will be put to no use at all during the next few years when they might serve constructive ends, but saved up for a more remote period when their effects will simply be calamitous.

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III. ATOMS AND INDUSTRY

The New Energy

BY STUART CHASE
Economist and Author

LET us take a speculative look at some of the peace-time effects of splitting the atom. As we do so, we will not forget the warning of Dr. Harold C. Urey, who helped to split it: "The peace-time applications of atomic energy are of no importance whatever unless the danger of atomic bombs is banished from the earth."

Thorstein Veblen in his grave must now be permitting himself a sardonic smile. His technicians and scientists have come roaring into their own as the acknowledged and undisputed arbiters of human destiny. He traced the trend in a series of books a generation ago, but few paid much attention. The philosophers were off in other pastures. Now the trend has culminated in a self-generating flood of neutrons which can blow up the world. For the first time, scientists are developing a social conscience, and even daring to dispute the generals and politicians. Veblen used to dream of a governing council of technicians. If the politicians do not look alive, it might come to that. They look pretty dead in Congress now.

Energy is a determiner of civilization. Low-energy cultures absorb most of their man-power in getting food. High-energy cultures such as the United States, or Western Europe, in recent years, can release more than half their man-power for the service trades, education, and the arts. The atom may release 90 per cent for higher things—if enough higher things can be found. Not 10 per cent will be needed for farming, mining, and manufacturing. Even before the war, learned committees were worrying about the problem of leisure. Presently they are going to have a superlative opportunity to worry!

Dr. A. H. Compton sees the first use in large central power plants, and most scientists agree with him. A reasonably efficient plant, using superheated steam for driving a turbine, could be put in operation within a year, he says. But costs at first would be high. The generating heat unit will be a pile weighing not less than 50 tons. This dissipates, for the present at least, those bright dreams of lump-of-sugar prime movers, to drive a plane from Chicago to Shanghai.

A pound of uranium now costs $3, about the same as a ton of coal. But it can deliver as much energy as 1,000 tons of coal under present firing methods. This is the comfortable margin atomic energy has to work on. Dr. Compton expects many big central plants within 10 years, especially in areas where power is now expensive. China and India come to mind as candidates for rapid industrialization. These plants will be easy to operate without smoke or fumes of any kind. Lethal rays must be carefully controlled, but safety methods have already been worked out at Oak Ridge and Hanford.

Atomic energy can be used as a heat for making bricks, cement, ceramics, and glass. It can be used for smelting metals. Dr. Langer of the California Institute of Technology has suggested that iron might be smelted in the ore bed. Others have suggested that highways in certain areas might be built and surfaced by fusing the ground to lava—as happened under the bomb in New Mexico.

The new energy can work wonders in providing both cheap heat and cheap power for the host of synthetics and plastics which are already revolutionizing industry. The virtue of a plastic from the manufacturing point of view is that it can be molded to unvarying form, and run through the assembly line without the grinding and chipping and shaping needed for natural products, like lumber, stone, and metal. Lavish production of plastics is bound to bring a vast increase in economic self-sufficiency. Synthetic rubber, nylon, and vinyl esters are just the beginning.

Stuart Chase

Controlled neutrons have a great many medical applications, such as the irradiation of deep cancers, the tracing of physiological processes by tagged atoms. They can make the dream of the alchemists—the transmutation of elements—a commonplace. We could perhaps change all our lead to gold—if we were that foolish. Atomic energy can air-condition cities in the tropics, and warm up polar housing for the comfort of man. By the electrification of soils and other innovations, it might change the whole crop pattern.

This outline is only a bare summary of uses now being suggested, but it is enough to indicate a shattering impact on the structure of business-as-usual. The mining of coal will be hit hard, petroleum only less hard. John L. Lewis can be expected to issue a papal ban against nuclear physics any day now. The steel industry, and metals generally, may be turned upside down. Railroad and steamship lines may lose up to 40 per cent of their revenue freight. Technological unemployment could grow to catastrophic proportions, if everything is left to God and the National Association of Manufacturers, to use Alvin Johnson's phrase.

If we try to go on operating some such economic system as we had before 1930, it does not take an especially discern-

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ing eye to see that atomic energy will soon break it to pieces. We have here an economic bomb of great explosive power. No nation, except the United States, has any apparent intention of continuing its pre-war economic system. Other states may be expected to nationalize atomic power, easing it into the economic structure under carefully controlled conditions, with regard for both the human beings and the industries made obsolete. It will be a large and complicated operation.

Can the United States avoid a similar course? Professor Hayek's disciples will vigorously protest, but how can any community endure the million to one shock of this new energy without planning for it? On the practical level, how could a wildly disorganized America hope to compete with other powers when they had organized the flow of neutrons?

Before the war no industrial country devoted as much as 1 per cent of its national income to scientific research. This ratio is now destined to leap upward. J. D. Bernal thinks it may go as high as 20 per cent. Not only research, but education and training on all levels, on a scale hitherto undreamed of, are an absolute must for survival in the atomic age.

As the first item on the educational agenda, I respectfully suggest that another two billion dollars be allocated, this time to the *social scientists*. An equally urgent directive should go along with it. Perhaps after some time in the laboratory and plenty of courage and effort, they can show us how to live with the unbelievable power the physical scientists have loosed upon us.

Power and Progress

BY BORIS PREGEL

President, Canadian Radium and Uranium Corporation; expert on radioactivity

AS SOON as the roaring of the atomic explosions over Japan began to resound in the press, in the statements, and in private conversations, I tried in vain to find some indication of interest in the *peaceful* application of atomic energy. With the exception of a few general remarks, the whole interest was concentrated on the bomb and the dangers of a varying nature attached to it. A few statesmen and scientists who ventured some remarks concerning the peace-time field were in a rather negative mood and predicted that we needed more than a generation—and some of them even spoke about a 50-year period—before we could see any possibilities for the peaceful applications of atomic power.

But what a change has occurred during the last few weeks! One may say that they have at last seen the light. Suddenly, from all sides, and sometimes even from the same people who were so pessimistically inclined only a month ago, we hear that the applications of atomic energy to civilian life are possible, imminent, and even unavoidable.

The aims of our forum are constructive. We believe the principal importance of atomic energy lies exclusively in its possibilities for peace-time development. We firmly believe that everything must and will be done to prevent the use of the atomic bomb in war. If this cannot be achieved, we should eliminate further discussion on the subject, because the atomic bomb with its terrific destruction will leave the remnants of the surviving humanity in no condition to think of any kind of cultural or industrial developments.

Ten days ago, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the leading men of the atomic energy project, said in an interview:

> The atomic bomb was not a step on the road to the production of controlled atomic energy. The bomb itself was the end result, the solution of a military problem that had been given to us. In coping with that problem we learned how to create and control atomic energy a year and a half before Hiroshima. But we had to pass that point. We had to find ways to make that energy explode. The production of atomic energy was merely a step on the way to that goal.
>
> It is quite feasible that a city the size of Seattle should be completely heated from an atomic energy source in less than five years.

We may accept this authoritative opinion, in view of the fact that the author has always been very cautious in his statements. What can we expect from the development of science in nuclear physics? What is in the immediate future? We think the first important application of atomic energy will be the production of cheap power by large plants, the locations of which are not dependent on any natural resources of the country. This is a tremendous advantage, especially for desert regions—for backward world areas—and for the development of countries with limited natural resources.

These powerful units will be able to distribute this cheap power to large areas. It is easy to understand what such a phenomenon will mean for these areas. Cheap power in unlimited quantity means abundance of cheap products, and the reduction of working hours.

Science has made important progress in the last few years in the fields of electronics, electrometallurgy, medicine, biology, agriculture, and so on. In all these, the possibility of cheap energy would mean immediate application of a series of new inventions and improvements on a large scale, and an immediate rise in the standard of living of the population.

The application of the cheap power, facilitating the creation of new industries, may reduce the production of certain metals and fuels which are the backbone of our present economy. But they will be replaced by new products, rationally manufactured under better conditions, and in the interest of the progress of the community.

The production of energy by the big power plants will be accompanied by a quasi unlimited production of artificial radioactive materials. Artificial radioactive elements which emit electrons are already being used now for biological, medical, and agricultural experiments, as so-called tracer elements. With the aid of such elements it is possible to investigate the metabolism of men and plants, to recognize and avoid diseases, and to improve the yield of plants.

Artificial radioactive elements, such as emitters of electrons, possibly can replace our electric installations, because electrons are carriers of our electric stream. Collected on plates, they produce electric potentials from which the electricity can be conducted. The replacement of the heated wires in the electronic tubes by radioactive materials makes us independent of heavy storage batteries, or batteries of great current capacity. We do not even need small batteries for collecting the charge of the emitted electrons, if we bend the electrons

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with a magnetic field to the place we want to charge. As it is possible today to make very strong magnets, we are independent of any electrical installation. We also can produce heat in metallic plates and wires without any electrical installation, directing the electrons to the parts we want to heat. The heat will be produced in the parts where the electrons are absorbed. Mechanical effects can be produced by ironization current, due to the heavy ironizating radiation. With photo-conductive materials strong relay effects can be obtained.

New aspects are open for television: transmission stations without powerful central stations will be possible.

Also, it is not impossible that we will be able to imitate cosmic radiation, either with the energy of a uranium pile or with a special apparatus. In this case, we would deal with radiation of such an energy that evaporation of atomic nuclei will be possible. That means we could convert any kind of matter into energy, and we would not be limited to the use of rare and expensive materials, such as uranium. All kinds of matter existing in the world could be used as a source of energy.

But perhaps the most important thing that we will learn from all of these experiments is not only how to decompose matter but also how to construct it. And we will be able to produce artificially any kind of material needed, because we will have at our disposal tremendous energies necessary for the artificial production.

Science and philosophy of the pre-atomic era were based on the concept of matter. The new science and philosophy of the atomic era are based on the concept of energy. The possibility of transforming matter into energy, and vice versa, changes completely our philosophical point of view with all the consequences, such as values of power and materials.

Until our time there has been no discovery equal to that of atomic energy. The greatest discoveries up to now advanced humanity a maximum of 50 years. The development of atomic energy moves humanity forward several centuries. It opens up the doors to the golden age without revolution or war, and even without very painful transitional periods. It brings equalization to peoples without large natural resources. It creates the possibility for peoples from the backward areas of the world to enter the family of advanced peoples on equal terms. In other words, the atomic-energy era means—equality, peace, and happiness.

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For the Benefit of All

BY JAMES CAREY

Secretary-Treasurer of the C. I. O.

JUST one month ago, a group of labor leaders, members of the General Executive Board of the C. I. O., met in Washington to discuss the question of atomic energy. One may ask why ordinary labor leaders presume to discuss a scientific phenomenon such as this. I believe it grows out, in part at least, of the change that has taken place in the labor movement in recent years. The C. I. O. is not concerned solely with wages, hours, and working conditions. It considers every important economic, political, and social question, and attempts to formulate a program in the interests of all the people, believing that it can thus best serve the interests of its members.

Labor leaders have a right to speak out because their activity makes it necessary for them to know the possibilities and the dangers in the development of an atomic bomb. They are required to know something about industrial developments in all countries of the world, including their own. In other countries, they may have better access to the factories and to the people than do our diplomatic representatives. We cannot talk about a central pool of information regarding atomic energy, the development of atomic bombs, and the use of atomic energy in good living as well as for destructive purposes unless the workers in the plants are conscious of their responsibilities to workers in other parts of the world.

As we develop our international organization in the field of labor, I believe for the first time we will have an opportunity to get the real facts regarding what is being produced in any given nation. In that way, perhaps, we will cut across these ultra-nationalistic attitudes and make a contribution to peace and security in the world. These workers know what they are producing. They have perhaps a better idea even than those who invented these mechanisms, of how they can be translated into positive and concrete methods either for good use or for destructive purposes. We believe more emphasis must be given to the good that can come out of this important development in the field of science, but like every other step in progress, a great deal of harm can also be anticipated.

We have had other cases of a similar nature; for instance, the development of aircraft was brought about in large part during the stress of war. Yet we had peace-time uses for this tremendous development. Tremendous technological gains have been brought about in this nation under the compulsion of war, the need for production. We have reason to fear that some of those great gains, made through the patriotic effort of the people of this nation, may operate against their interest, and that because of their efforts they may be confronted with the hazards of mass unemployment. We are not able to digest all of our advances, and we still find that many gains made in scientific fields are not transmitted to the people. Unless we pass on such gains for the people, it creates a danger to our society. Perhaps the atomic bomb can serve to awaken the people of the world to the need of moving at a greater pace in solving the simple little problem of living together in peace.

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IV. THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

Several speeches at this session have had to be omitted, among them an excellent extemporaneous comment by Justice Jerome Frank, and remarks by Cord Meyer, Jr., and Kingman Brewster.

Unite—or Else

BY EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER
Columnist and foreign correspondent

EVER since World War I, it has been apparent that world government offers the only visible hope of saving mankind from ultimate destruction. Material techniques have outstripped political institutions. World War II came—as Wilson had predicted it would, and with consequences even worse than Wilson foresaw.

Aviation alone threatened to terrorize mankind. By the end of 1943 Air Marshal William A. Bishop of Canada uttered a warning. In a little book that attracted far less attention than it should have, the greatest Allied ace of World War I pointed out the futility of nations quarreling over their several economic systems if all these systems, regardless, were going to be blown to bits by an aviator "laying" a few blockbusters.

Shortly after this volume appeared, in 1944, V-1's began falling upon London. Allied airmen also discovered a way of shooting many of them down short of their mark. Then the V-2's began to fall. Against them no defense was ever found. London—heroic to the last—just "took" them. Meanwhile normal, garden-variety aviation hammered Germany into surrender. When Germany collapsed our people found more than the launching platforms for V-2. They found the plans for V-10. This was a rocket-propelled bomb that would cross the Atlantic Ocean in the stratosphere. Against it, once more, no defense was known.

Shortly after came Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All existing explosives became obsolete. Mankind entered the atomic age. And it threatens to be his last.

Having spent many hours with the scientists who made the bomb and who certainly know the most about its potentialities, present and future, I am not impressed by laymen, generals, admirals, senators, bankers, and miscellaneous bigmouths who hastened to assure us that the discovery of the atomic bomb had really changed little or nothing. It is a question of definition. I follow the scientists. These men agree: 1) the atomic bomb cannot be kept secret; 2) the atomic bomb will soon be built by all industrial nations; 3) the bombs that razed Hiroshima and Nagasaki are just a faint foretaste of the bigger and better atomic bombs to come; 4) against the atomic bomb there is no adequate defense—and will in all likelihood be none; 5) similar bombs will soon be made in relatively small buildings and ultimately perhaps by lunatics in the kitchen sink; 6) the effect of sudden atomic aggression on the victim country would be not only murderous but would probably so weaken the receiving country that its capacity for retaliation would be crippled; the only way to prevent mankind from atomizing itself is to make sure that atomic weapons will never be used; finally, the only way sure to do this is to make sure there will be no more war.

For the last decades, it has been growing obvious that technological invention was rendering the system of sovereign states economically and politically obsolescent. Economically obsolescent because it no longer contributed to the material well-being of mankind. Its tariff walls, regulations, red tape, my-country-right-or-wrong thinking, were a hindrance to maximum human prosperity. Politically, obsolescent because it had ceased to provide even relative security for most of mankind. Before the discovery of the bomb, in planning a world organization, we accepted the fact that only three states—the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, could enjoy real security on their own. The other countries were asked to "trust" to the good will of these three—the word is that of Secretary of State Stettinius at San Francisco. As though great powers had ever given mankind any reason to trust them!

The atomic age put an end to the security of the three giants as well.

If you accept the fact that mankind must banish war, then inevitably—if you can think straight—you reach the conclusion that mankind must achieve world government. Nothing less can do the trick.

No Middle Ground

BY THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Lawyer and Author

MY MODEST little subject, "Is World Government the Answer?" may be divided into two parts: (1) Can the United Nations Organization be preserved? and (2) Is world government possible in the immediate future?" Both of these questions come down to the same thing: that is, are we going to continue our present system of arm's length dealing between independent nation-states or are we going to set up a world state?

We cannot discuss these questions intelligently, I think, unless we define for ourselves, much more clearly than we have, just what we mean by world government and what the consequences of our adopting it and of our not adopting it are. The discussion of these questions so far has been extremely confused. Often those who deny the practicability of world government will propose steps which amount to exactly that. Often those who are convinced that nothing short of world government can stop atomic war shrink from the necessary implications of a super-sovereignty and make proposals which in fact merely perpetuate the concert system on which the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization are founded. They want world government in the abstract not in the particular. There is a need for a definition.

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There are only two alternatives before us in this matter of the organization of peace. The first is a world government. The other is an agreement between nations based on good will. There is nothing in between. There are variations in the two categories. But the inescapable fact is that either you have an enforceable world law or you haven't. I emphasize this because there is at the moment an almost frantic search for a middle ground—something that will be more than the old system of agreements between governments, but yet will avoid the violent upheaval in our political concepts and our national independence inherent in the setting up of a super-state. No such middle ground exists or can be created.

Both alternatives—world government or agreements between governments—carry with them certain very disagreeable consequences. We have not, I think, fully taken in what a world government would mean in terms of surrender of national power by the United States. On the other hand, I am sure that we have not yet realized how serious will be the military regulation of our economy and our people—especially the urban populations—if we are to be compelled to live in a world of independent nation states armed with modern weapons of mass destruction. This is a choice between two pills both of which are hard to swallow. But I cannot believe that when we fully consider the alternatives we can reach any conclusion other than that world government is the only course which holds any prospect either for a decent way of life or for the avoidance of atomic war.

First let us see what we mean by world government, not as a broad conceptual matter but in practical terms. The way to do this is, I think, to take one by one the steps necessary to set up an effective control of the modern weapons of mass destruction under a rule of law.

The first proposition is that we cannot stop the use of these weapons except by preventing their manufacture. If they are allowed to come into existence they will be used. Therefore, we must start with a rule enacted by some international organization prohibiting the manufacture of certain types of weapons. The United Nations Organization is a convenient medium for this purpose. Therefore, the UNO Charter should be amended so as to include, as one of its principles, the rule that certain specific weapons shall not be manufactured.

By itself, such a rule would be merely a statement of good intentions like the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 by which 65 nations solemnly and forever renounced war. Therefore, UNO must be given the physical power to enforce this rule. How to give UNO this power is a technical military matter. The political principle is that the power shall be sufficient. If UNO does not have the physical power to see to it that its rules are obeyed, there will be no effective law. Whatever law may mean as a matter of philosophy, for this purpose it means a rule which as a practical matter can and will be enforced.

But even this is not enough. For once you start on this business of setting up an *enforceable* system of stopping the manufacture of certain weapons, certain consequences inevitably follow. There is a package of minimum requirements. If any component part of that package is withdrawn the system ceases to be enforceable and becomes a mere promise between sovereign governments based on their good will and good faith.

Thus, UNO would have to have the right to send its inspectors into all parts of the world to know whether its rule was being violated. The refusal by a government to let the inspectors inspect would have to be illegal, bringing down with it all the sanctions necessary to compel the recalcitrant government to allow UNO's orders to be carried out. Also, there would have to be some way of supplementing the basic law against the manufacture of certain kinds of weapons—to add new weapons to the proscribed list, to specify the methods of inspection, and generally to keep up with the enormous and changing complications inherent in any effective system of control by law. In other words, UNO would have to have a legislature with the power to make law within its constitutional powers. And such a legislature could not operate by unanimous voting, but would have to act by a majority. And representation in such a legislature could not be on the undemocratic basis of one vote for each nation state.

Another fundamental change would be necessary. The Security Council could not function as it does now as a *political* body, with the power to act or not to act as its sovereign members choose. If the Security Council is to be the executive of UNO it will have to act as any other executive. If there is a law, it must be enforced automatically. It must not require a new *political* decision each time a specific case comes before it that the law shall be enforced. Only the *manner* of enforcement must be open for discussion. This means that the steps to stop a violation of UNO's fundamental law cannot be taken by the present voting system of the Security Council. A majority vote of the Council would be one way, or the setting up of a different kind of executive body of UNO.

Moreover, UNO's law would have to operate directly on the individual citizen. If the UNO inspectors report that plant A in Country X is making atomic bombs, UNO may first tell the government of X to stop the manufacture, but if government X fails to comply, UNO will have to act directly against the offending plant. If UNO were to act only through the government of X, the enforcement of the law would take the form in each instance of a negotiation between UNO and the government of X, with all the delays and inaction such a negotiation would entail. No law can be enforced in this way.

Also, if this enormous power were granted to UNO some judicial body (presumably the Permanent Court of International Justice) would have to determine whether a violation of UNO's law had taken place. UNO could not subject an alleged offender (say a manufacturing plant in a great city) to the frightful penalty of being bombed, or even to any lesser penalty, without having it clearly and judicially established that it had broken the law.

To summarize: If you want to make a rule that certain weapons shall not be manufactured and to set up an effective system to enforce that rule, you unavoidably, as an absolute minimum, call for a world government which (1) works under a fixed rule of law, (2) has a legislature to modify that law within the limits of the powers of that government's charter, (3) has an executive whose duty it is to apply the

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law directly against the offending individuals, with no right to debate, as a political matter, whether it shall or shall not do so, (4) has an information system which will keep the executive informed of what is going on, (5) has a judiciary to determine whether a violation has taken place and (6) has overwhelming physical force to enable it to stop any violation of its fundamental law.

There may be other conditions which would follow if an effective control of armaments is to be set up. I think there are. Thus it is not enough to make illegal the manufacturing of certain weapons if you are to have peace—which is, after all, what we are trying to get by all these mechanics. It will be necessary to make any form of war, civil or otherwise, illegal. But such a law in turn would freeze the *status quo* and would raise the question whether a peaceful change provision would not be necessary—something like the enactment as law of the principle of self-determination. But I do not want to get into these further complexities at this point. I want only to make it clear that those who are suggesting an effective control of weapons of mass destruction, based on enforceable law, are in fact demanding world government with all its component parts.

It is no wonder then that many people, even of those who can contemplate change without distaste, are appalled by the implications of an attempt to control the manufacture of these weapons. World government adds up to—world government, the setting up of something more powerful than the Government of the United States. It is not surprising that there is this search for a middle ground—something in between doing nothing and this crossing of the Rubicon into the land of the World State.

[*At this point Mr. Finletter discussed at length several "middle ground proposals."*]

The implications of world government are very serious. But what about the implications of *not* having world government? Clearly, tremendously important questions of domestic policy depend on which of these two solutions is adopted. If we had a world state we could, and indeed probably would, be required to disarm almost entirely our national forces. It would be against the law for us to have weapons of mass destruction and there would be no point in having substantial amounts of the others. We would have put all our armament eggs in one basket of world government. But if we decide to go the other course and to continue our experiments with the agreement or good faith method, prudence demands that we take on a defense program the like of which this country has not yet dreamed of. For the agreement method means—unless all history is wrong—that war, some time or other, sooner or later, is inevitable; and we would have to be ready for it.

What these preparations would have to be is a matter which only the military men and the scientists can talk about with authority. But the laymen have to consider these things and, as matters look at the moment, it seems we should think along the following lines:

(1) The important thing is defense against sudden attack. We will be on the receiving end at the beginning of the next war. The attack will probably be extremely violent and without warning.

(2) We will have to make arrangements which will protect our military installations, industrial centers and urban populations from being destroyed in such an attack, so that we will have something to retaliate with to protect ourselves against invasion and conquest.

(3) Until such time as we learn that other nations have developed atomic and other weapons capable of such an attack—say three to five years or possibly a short time longer — we can, and probably will, disregard the danger. But once we are confronted with the possibility of such an attack, we will have to submit to drastic regulation of our industry and our urban populations. The need for these defensive preparations will increase sharply as we withdraw our troops from Germany and Japan.



Thomas K. Finletter

(4) What form our preparations for defense against atomic attack will take will depend on (a) the recommendations of the military and the scientists in the light of the armament of other nations, and (b) the political feasibility of putting into effect what they recommend—that is, the willingness of the American people to put up with drastic regulation of their industry and urban populations. A case may well arise where it will be politically impossible for any United States government to enact the kind of law which the experts will say is necessary for the national defense. The people may prefer having the country open to devastating attack rather than accept the drastic regulation of their lives which may be necessary in the light of the then existing weapons in the possession of other countries. This is another way of saying that democracies will always be at a disadvantage.

(5) But even so, if we keep our international organization on the basis of reliance on the good will of the other nations of the world, we will necessarily adopt a high degree of interference by the federal government with the liberty of the individual. If we were to have only a race in the preparation of atomic weapons for offense, this would not greatly increase the control of the government over the affairs of the individual. The difficulty comes from the necessity of preparing the country so that it can *take* an atomic attack and still be able to strike back. How much this will lead in the direction of total control by the government over the location of industry, the right of individuals to live in crowded urban centers, complete military service and the totally militarized state may be left to the imagination.

The people of this country thus have quite a decision to make—whether to try to achieve world government *before* the nations get involved in an armament race, or, on the other hand, to get busy about winning that race.

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The decision will probably be made within the next few years, that is within the period of grace allowed to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom by their exclusive ownership of atomic engineering know-how. If by that time some effective world law preventing the manufacture of these weapons is not set up, the armament race will begin of its own accord. Once started, it will be very much harder to stop it than before it began. It is one thing to get the nations to agree not to manufacture certain weapons; it is *very much another thing* to get them to agree to give those weapons up.

For this reason the UNO commission called for by the Truman-Attlee Atomic Declaration is of the highest importance. A reading of that Declaration shows that it can go either way. It opens up the road—indeed it fairly clearly envisages—world government. It calls for "effective enforceable safeguards against (the) use (of atomic energy) for destructive purposes . . .," the "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes, . . . the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, . . . effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means" and "the rule of law." Certainly the necessary implication of such measures is world government.

On the other hand, the atomic declaration makes it clear that the work of the UNO Commission is to "proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken." There is thus no commitment of the British and American governments to work toward the immediate creation of a world state. The commitment is only to try to create the conditions of mutual confidence which will make the setting up of the "adequate safeguards" possible.

Now what does this policy of gradual stages imply? It can mean one or two things. First, that the governments of the United States and Britain are not sure that their own peoples are ready for world government and that they must be led into it, if at all, by easy stages. Secondly, that no world government can be set up unless Russia agrees, and that the only way to get her to accept it is to take the matter up with her tactfully and gradually.

I believe that the Atomic Declaration means both these things. The first lies within our own power to satisfy. If the American people will show what I believe to be the fact, that they are willing to accept the implications of membership in a world government if they believe that to be the only way of stopping war, then their government can act with vigor in putting this view up to the governments and peoples of the rest of the world.

The other difficulty is beyond our immediate control. I have no idea whether the governments of Great Britain and Russia would agree to set up "enforceable safeguards" against war in the form of a world government. I am however reasonably certain of one thing, and that is that there is only one way in which we can find out, and that is to offer it to them.

But, we will be told, all this is impossible; the people are not ready for such a drastic step. Perhaps they are not. But we must, I think, be careful not to lay the blame for our failure to bring our antiquated international machinery up to date on shoulders where it does not belong. Are we sure that this failure is not caused by an unjustified lack of faith in the political and moral maturity of the peoples of the world? Are we sure that the peoples would not willingly go along with any sensible plan which would give them some hope of living decently and in peace?

The Veteran's View

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE
Chairman, American Veterans' Committee

OURS is a most extraordinary world, a world in which technological developments have led us into such a literally revolutionary time, that we must also revolutionize our political thinking.

Our situation is dangerous because the present organization of society vests control of extraordinarily destructive weapons in the hands of men who owe their allegiance to some power less inclusive than the sovereign power of all men. It is obvious that we must change our political arrangements, and change them quickly. I agree entirely with what Beardsley Ruml said a few days ago: we need a triple-decker, three-way program. We don't have to say we are in favor of one thing and drop everything else. We can work hard through existing diplomatic channels at the problem of how to get along with Russia and relieve the tensions developing between us. At the same time we can do everything possible to insure support of the United Nations Organization, get the necessary legislation through the Senate, and do what needs to be done to make the meeting in January a success—even work for strengthening amendments to the Charter. Doing either or both of those things does not mean that we cannot at the same time work for world government, for a quick and radical transformation of the UNO into a real world government.

The proposition that we can gradually achieve that third phase—world government—is a little like Norman Cousins' illustration of the man standing at the edge of a wide chasm with a forest fire creeping up behind him, looking across and saying, "I can't make the whole jump at once; I guess I better take one step at a time." To improve relations with Russia and to improve the UNO, is not to make that gradual approach. Although you have to take the jump all at once, you need a running start. Trying to relieve the tensions, build up as much community of interest as possible, and strengthen the UNO, perhaps will be our running start for world government.

There is not much time, but we can go much faster than we think. We shall have tremendous support from many of the men who fought the war. Sovereignty doesn't seem like much of a defense to a man who has been in a B-29 over Tokyo, with the flak rattling off the cabin walls, or to a man who has lived in six inches of water in a foxhole for two months. That sovereignty, if it is sovereignty, is something we value little. It is a sovereignty which will be no protection to us. It is a false sovereignty in that it ignores the true sovereignty, which is of us, all the people here in this country, and in this world, who feel that we would like to go on living. There will be no veterans of the next war.

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Science Must be Free

BY LOUIS N. RIDENOUR
Physics Department, University of Pennsylvania; Radiation Laboratory, M.I.T.; War Department consultant

NATIONAL and international control of this terrible weapon that has been put into our hands is important and perhaps, within the immediate future, crucial. However, one aspect of this general question which is all too seldom discussed is who, if anyone, is to control the future progress of basic, fundamental science. In the very considerable discussion concerning ways and means of saving man from the armageddon which the invention of the atomic bomb has made relatively cheap and practicable, the question of world-wide scientific freedom versus restrictive nationalistic control of science has scarcely been noticed. Many people, including several competent scientists, feel that it is idle to discuss this question of scientific freedom while the much larger issues of the survival of mankind, or of civilization, cannot yet be dealt with adequately.

I cannot agree with this position. It seems to me that when the view is widely held that it is actually possible for a nation to keep a secret composed of some fragments of knowledge about the interaction of matter and of radiation, and when our army destroys the cyclotrons of Japan presumably on the assumption that these are weapons of war instead of instruments of scientific investigation, and when our treatment of individual scientists in the conquered countries suggests that we are on the verge of regarding these men individually as war criminals, it is necessary to consider the scientist's view of science and the possibility of its control.

Briefly put, the scientist believes that there is a fundamental understandability about nature. He further believes that the virtue of scientific ideas in his field lies in their agreement with experiment, so that ultimately there is no such thing as opinion in science. There is only relative truth, an idea which agrees with experiment, and relative falsity, an idea which does not agree with experiment. Just as ultimately there is no such thing as opinion in science, so ultimately there is no such things as concealment in science. Given then the unscientific belief in the fundamental understandability and universal accessibility of nature, one comes naturally to the scientist's pre-war method of conducting his science: it is in every sense of the word international.

German, French, and English were the universal languages which every advanced student had to learn to read, at least, and scientific papers were always published in one of these three languages. Students and staff members, research workers at all levels, were interchanged between countries. Every country engaged in research and in investigation to the ultimate limit of its desirability and, most important of all, there was immediate international publication of all scientific results. Scientists recognized that in a discipline whose aim was the elucidation of the universe, it was idle and wrong to regard the results of experimentation and of speculative thought as being less than the property of all men.

For reasons of military secrecy, with which no one would take issue while our country was in peril, the pre-war freedom of science was entirely lost during the war. Most basic scientific work was stopped, too, because scientists made themselves useful as engineers, applying what was already known to design, an outstanding example being the design of the atomic bomb. However, the war is over now and we have the very interesting present-day situation in which our political leaders and virtually everyone responsible is giving voice to the most pious remarks about the necessity for political internationalism, eventual world government, and a planet-wide brotherhood of man, while at the same time there seems to be little attempt to restore the old internationalism of science. Instead, people seem to assume that science will henceforth be conducted on a nationalistic basis.

Criticism of the nationalization of science, based on idealism, is remarkably easy to make, but it is not likely to move practical people in an age when the threat of an atomic war is as near and as frightening as it is today. What I should like to do is point out that one can make a strong indictment of the nationalization of science on a practical nationalistic basis. Even if we are America Firsters, even if we want our country to prosper in spite of the rest of the world or at its expense or to become strong enough to conquer the rest of the world, it would not be practical to attempt to nationalize science. Science is far less a body of information than it is a group of men who understand this information, who have the knowledge and the ability to make use of it and expend it. The country whose scientists are members of a cult or a secret lodge, a country which restricts its scientific knowledge so that fact A can be taught in the colleges and fact B cannot, is well on the way to destroying its scientific traditions and dispersing its scientists. Even from the standpoint of pure nationalism, this is a bad idea. It is basic to any sort of secrecy that someone must decide who is to be let in on a particular secret. It is equally basic to scientific thought that no man is competent to judge what a person must be told in order that he may make a scientific discovery or an advance or construct a theory or do a meaningful experiment.

It should also be observed that such nationalization of science creates quite natural suspicion of national motives. Since the supposed benefits of scientific nationalism in the minds of those who favor it are limited to its expected usefulness in war, any attempt on our part to nationalize science will be regarded by other nations as part of our preparations for a war. Thus, an attempt to nationalize science can stand in the way of the trust and understanding between nations, which must precede any control of the atomic bomb. But this again is an idealistic argument and I must apologize for advancing it.

Let us say, instead, that any attempt of this sort will cause other countries to put an intense effort into attracting good men to scientific pursuits. It will cause them to finance scientific investigation and, if they are clever, to maintain the most rigid scientific freedom so that their scientists can work effectively. This may enable other countries to be better prepared scientifically for a war than we would like to see them. Our policy of scientific nationalization would have been responsible.

Apart from the type of national control of science that I have so far considered—control of scientific publication and dissemination of scientific information—there is another sort

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of control which has been suggested as wise or necessary. This is a kind of supervision which will prevent the scientist from harming the public at large by his practice in the dark arts. There seems to be a confusion in the minds of many people between scientists and scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and so-called scientific weapons of war, on the other. There seems to be a belief that there is something inherently bad about scientific knowledge that fits it uniquely to be turned over to the destruction of other men. Scientists, I am afraid, have done their part to heighten this impression by being proud of the war-time achievements in engineering weapons. It is difficult not to be proud of a good job. However, I think it is time we pointed out that a body of scientific knowledge and a group of capable scientists, as a natural resource, are quite comparable to a steel mill and the people necessary to run it. You can make either sewing machines and typewriters or machine-guns and cannon out of the steel that comes from the mill. We don't need to fear science and scientists in a world at peace; we need fear only those persons who would lead nations into war.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE FORUM

AT THE close of the last session of the forum Freda Kirchwey presented to the delegates the series of Propositions" which had provided the framework of the discussions. After some debate it was agreed unanimously that the Propositions be accepted as expressing the sense of the forum, and Miss Kirchwey was instructed to formulate resolutions based upon them. A proposal that a paragraph be inserted calling directly for the creation of a world government was rejected because lack of time made adequate discussion impossible. But it was clearly the feeling of the meeting that changes in the United Nations Organization, to increase its authority and convert it as rapidly as possible into a body whose decisions would have the force of law, should be vigorously pressed.

The resolutions agreed upon by the forum follow:

SINCE the basic scientific information about nuclear fission is known everywhere and it is only a matter of time before the production of atomic bombs is possible in all industrially advanced countries; and since the development of aviation, particularly of rocket-propelled robot planes, will soon annihilate distance and minimize the human factor in attack, eliminating the possibility of effective, long-range defense against aggression with atomic weapons; and

SINCE we are therefore faced with the problem of finding political rather than mechanical methods of dealing with the overwhelming dangers created by the discovery of atomic explosives and other new destructive devices; and

SINCE effective political methods can only be devised if the nations succeed in minimizing such existing political factors as (a) long-continued differences of interest and policy between the Soviet Union and the Western powers and (b) the effect on other nations of America's monopoly of the secret of atomic-bomb manufacture and of our continued production of these bombs—

THEREFORE, we are agreed:

1. That the plan for international control through the United Nations Organization proposed by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister King should be fortified by consultation with the Soviet Union so that assurance of full cooperation by the Soviet government may be secured in advance of the UNO Assembly meeting in January;

2. That the United States take the initiative in arranging further consultation concerning conflicts of interests in areas of tension such as the Balkans, Iran, the Near East, and the Far East in order to replace the present dangerous tactics of provocation and counter-provocation by conciliation or, if necessary, honest collective bargaining;

3. That, at the same time, plans for establishing atomic control through the UNO should be energetically pushed and the program outlined in the Truman-Attlee-King statement more sharply defined;

4. That one of the first acts of a control commission set up under the UNO should be the outlawing of the manufacture of atomic explosives and the destruction or conversion for industrial uses of those bombs already built by the United States;

5. That since wars and the danger of atomic destruction will be eliminated only when the superior authority of a world organization is accepted by all nations, an essential step in this direction is the abolition of the veto rule which today gives dictatorial power to a small group of great nations;

6. That in order to avoid control by private monopolies, national or international, over the industrial exploitation of atomic energy—which control would hinder the development of a new era of economic security and abundance—the government must keep in its own hands the sources of fissionable material and nationalize the actual production of atomic energy;

7. That Congress must devise control machinery which will insure the security of the country, prevent improper private exploitation of atomic developments, and at the same time encourage scientific experimentation by protecting freedom of research and a free exchange of scientific information;

8. And, finally, that to accomplish these ends a federal control commission must be composed of representatives of the people as a whole, including scientists, labor, the professions, business and industry, the government, and the armed forces, such commission to remain, however, under full civilian control.

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V. DINNER FORUM

"We Turned the Switch"

BY LEO SZILARD
Atom-bomb scientist; Metallurgical Laboratory, University of Chicago

ON MARCH 3, 1939, Dr. Walet Zinn and I, working on the seventh floor of the Pupin Building at Columbia University, completed a simple experiment to which we had been looking forward rather eagerly. Everything was ready, and all we had to do was to lean back, turn a switch, and watch the screen of a television tube. If flashes of light appeared on the screen, it would mean that neutrons were emitted in the fission of uranium, and that in turn would mean that the liberation of atomic energy was possible in our lifetime. We turned the switch, we saw the flashes, we watched them for about ten minutes—and then we switched everything off and went home. That night I knew that the world was headed for sorrow.

From March, 1939 until October of the same year work in the field of atomic energy was carried on by a handful of men who lacked many of the things they needed and most of all official recognition. From October, 1939, to the end of 1941 we still lacked many things, but we suffered from too much official recognition. Our increasing anxiety about what the Germans might be doing made our slow speed all the more intolerable.

At the end of 1941 there was an important change for the better. This change came in the wake of a visit which Dr. Oliphant of Birmingham, England, paid to this country around the middle of the war. Dr. Oliphant attended one of the meetings of the Uranium Committee as a guest and was not very much impressed by the organization and official guidance of our work. Disregarding international etiquette, he told anyone who was willing to listen what he thought of us. Considerations other than military secrecy prevent me from repeating the exact expressions he used. But he got results.

After the reorganization of our work at the end of 1941 we were all happy for a while. Sometime during 1942 the army was brought into the picture, but the officers who were attached to us realized that they did not know what it was all about and did not make life difficult for us. Toward the end of 1942 and during the first half of 1943 all sorts of troubles developed, not all of them originating with the army. At that time it became evident to most of us that unless our organization could be changed quickly, we would have no bombs ready by the spring of 1944, when we expected the invasion of Europe to begin. We saw no way of bringing about a change without a major row, and we could not take the risk of losing thereby more time than we might gain. During 1943 and part of 1944 our greatest worry was the possibility that Germany would perfect an atomic bomb before the invasion of Europe. I myself was firmly convinced that the Germans were ahead of us in this work. Today I know that I was wrong and that when the war ended the Germans had not reached the point from which we started when our work began in earnest.

In 1945, when we ceased worrying about what the Germans might do to us, we began to worry about what the government of the United States might do to other countries. Discussion of the subject started in Chicago in March of this year. There were those among us who thought that we should not set the precedent of using atomic energy for the purposes of destruction. About sixty of us at Chicago took the view that Japan was essentially defeated and that it would be wrong to attack its cities with atomic bombs as if atomic bombs were simply another military weapon. Many atomic scientists at Oak Ridge took a similar view. The use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not end but rather stimulated the discussion of this question.

For some four to six weeks after Hiroshima atomic scientists expressed no opinion on the political implications of the bomb, having been requested by the War Department to exercise the greatest possible reserve. Our response to this request does not mean that we were intimidated by the War Department. We kept silent because we all believed that Hiroshima was immediately followed by discussions between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, as indeed it should have been, and we did not want to embarrass the President or the Secretary of State.

Then, early in October, in a visit to Washington, I happened to pick up a copy of the May-Johnson bill and brought it back with me to Chicago. We were somewhat alarmed when we read in the papers that hearings were held for one day before the House Military Affairs Committee and then closed down for good. Our alarm increased when on October 9 we discovered that the War Department's early requests to us to exercise discretion in our public utterances were not occasioned by any negotiations with other powers but by its desire to have the May-Johnson bill passed "without unnecessary discussions in Congress."

This caused the Atomic Scientists of Chicago to issue a manifesto calling for adequate hearings in Congress on the general issue involved before any bill on the domestic control of atomic energy should be passed. Our statement marked the beginning of the fight of the scientists against the May-Johnson bill, a fight which has so far not been lost.

Feeling the need for a better understanding of what was happening in Washington, I went there and stayed six weeks. These are my conclusions: The most hopeful aspect of the

The Dinner on December 3, celebrating *The Nation's* Eightieth Anniversary, concluded the forum. Leon Henderson, former head of the OPA, presided, and Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt made a brief extemporaneous speech. Another guest of honor, Dr. Urey, also spoke extemporaneously, and his remarks as published here are consequently much abbreviated. Dr. Evatt spoke by radio telephone from Los Angeles. The main speech of the evening, by Harold Laski, chairman of the British Labor Party, was printed in full last week.

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situation in Washington is the fact that the problem of controlling atomic energy has so far not become a political problem, that is, the essential difference is not between Democrats and Republicans or between progressives and conservatives but rather between those who understand what atomic bombs may mean and those who do not understand it. The most important task would therefore seem to be somehow to impart to everyone a realization of the essentially non-terrestial nature of the atomic bomb.

I would like, therefore, to present tentatively the suggestion that the best way to put our foreign policy on a sound basis might consist in staging a demonstration of an atomic-bomb explosion for members of Congress, the President, and such other citizens as ought to witness it. Those of my friends who saw the tests in New Mexico on July 16 tell me how shaken they were by the experience. Most of them were ten miles or more away; if they had been nearer, the psychological effect would no doubt have been even greater. The risk which the statesmen would run individually by watching from a lesser distance appears to me small in comparison to the risk which we shall all incur collectively if we do not succeed in bringing home to them the non-terrestial nature of the phenomenon.

Naturally, I am not really worried about the future, except perhaps the next fifteen years. If we manage to get through the next fifteen years, alive, we shall probably emerge immune to atomic bombs. It seems to me that the greatest danger facing us at present is the possibility of a war which would arise more or less automatically out of an arms race in which the United States and Russia built up stockpiles of atomic bombs.

Is it possible to avert this danger? Let us assume that the United States and Russia agreed to have no stockpiles of atomic bombs and to permit no manufacture of atomic bombs on their territory. Let us, moreover, assume for the sake of argument that they both reserve the right to abrogate this arrangement at any time. Could Russia and the United States, under present-day conditions, make arrangements through which they could convince each other, as well as other nations, that secret violations of the agreement would be detected and would become known to the world? My answer to this question is emphatically Yes. Clearly the arrangements would have to include the right of inspection on the part of some international agency.

If Russia and the United States wanted to reassure each other concerning secret violations, they might go about it in the following way: After the agreement is ratified and becomes the law of the land, the President of the United States could call on all American engineers and scientists and ask them to pledge themselves to report to an international agency all violations committed on the territory of the United States. The Espionage Act would have to be modified so that it would no longer cover information of a scientific or technical nature, whether or not relating to national defense. All men classed as scientists or engineers would be invited to spend each year four weeks' vacation or six weeks' if you wish, abroad with their families as guests of the United Nations Organization. The Russian government would be expected to take similar action with respect to its own scientists and engineers.

No arrangement of this sort, of course, could rule out the possibility of war, and in case of war, sooner or later, atomic bombs would drop from the skies. Yet under such an arrangement war would break out only if one of the parties actually decided to start an arms race and risk a war. It would give us a respite which would be worth having, provided we know how to make use of it for building a permanent peace.

The Task Before Us

BY HAROLD C. UREY

Atom-bomb scientist; winner of Nobel Prize

THE year 1945 will go down in history as one of the most crucial, the most epoch-making of many centuries of the past. One can never speak about the future. Future history, in fact, may not last very long. It depends upon what we do with the very important period immediately before us. The point at which we have arrived in history, which is highlighted by the atomic bomb, is this: We have made technological warfare so dreadful that we cannot survive if we practice it. We have that choice to make. Do we wish to have this civilization, which has been built so laboriously for thousands of years, terminated at this point, or do we wish to see it go on? Do we wish to see our own race, evolved through almost endless time—hundreds of millions of years—terminated? Do we wish to go on with this sort of playing with very great fires and have a devastated earth?

These are things which I think can reasonably be expected to be ahead in the next decades if we wish to continue in this direction.

Of course, the problem first of all is how can we impress people with the seriousness of the situation. We need, first of all, to be thoroughly frightened. Of course, fright that leads to hysteria doesn't do us much good, but if we can channel a real good fright into the direction of constructive effort, great benefit may come from it.

As Dr. Szilard has said to you, we need to use equal imagination, equal courage in breaking with the past, in our experience in human affairs, that we have used in developing the atomic bomb. I think that it is possible to arouse the people of this country to the seriousness of the situation and induce them to think differently about the changed situation. Any solution that the scientific fraternity has been able to think of, or any one else has been able to suggest that I know of, involves some legal means of preventing war.

The essential problem of preventing war was considered by the founders of this country. Our own federal government was the result of these discussions. I should like to see the time come when the manufacture of atomic bombs and other weapons of war will be handled by a world organization such as counterfeiting is by our government. I believe this may happen sooner than we think. There should be laws against the manufacture of atomic and other weapons of war, and a police force to detect violations and arrest people (not states) who violate the law. There should be courts of justice to try those accused of violating the law. If guilty they should be imprisoned. I am convinced that only such a proceedure will prevent war.

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This control of war can come about only when the people of this country and those of other countries are willing to serve as policemen, judges, and juries and give moral sanction to the law. The ultimate source of law and its ultimate enforcement resides in the moral conscience of the citizens of a country and the world. As sovereignty in this country resides in the people of this country, so sovereignty of a world government must also reside in the people. We have atomic bombs and other countries do not. We should lead and not ask others to do so. This is our responsibility and opportunity.

A Stronger UNO

BY HERBERT VERE EVATT
Foreign Minister of Australia

THE advent of the atom bomb has dramatically illustrated but not essentially changed the problems of world security and world organization that were faced at San Francisco. At that great conference it was agreed by all that the human and physical devastation of war was so vast that it could be prevented only by a world organization armed with drastic powers to curb an aggressor.

Although the atom bomb had not yet been used in the war, the delegates to San Francisco thought that another world war would bring an end to our civilization. The devastation wrought in Europe is sufficient evidence that the world cannot endure another war even if the atom bomb is outlawed. However, the atom bomb has made more urgent the need for getting the new organization into working order.

The recent Three Powers statement on atomic energy points to the establishment of an agency under the jurisdiction of the United Nations with power to inspect the plant and laboratories of any nation in order to discover if there has been any violation of the proposed ban against atomic weapons. The setting up of a special atomic commission, the agreement to eliminate atomic weapons from national armaments, and the establishment of machinery for inspection will have to be fully discussed in the assembly of the United Nations Organization and in the legislature of the individual nation. But once international agreement is entered into and the new agency is established, obviously there can be no place for a veto power on the decision of the agency.

Here I desire to state most emphatically that the atom bomb, like every armament both old and new, is clearly covered by the United Nations provision giving the Assembly a right to take the initiative with respect to international agreement for armament regulations.

Above all, we must not lose sight of the fundamental principle that the objectives of the United Nations Organization are, first, to prevent wars; second, to suppress aggressors by force if necessary, and third, to remove the underlying causes of war—economic and otherwise. It would be a great setback to these objectives if the main forces of the United Nations Organization were thought to be the laying down of rules by which future wars should be conducted.

Again the United Nations Charter places a positive obligation on each member nation to place at the disposal of the Security Council not only its armed forces but its warlike "facilities." In my opinion, no nation can carry out its duties to the organization unless it is prepared, subject of course to reasonable safeguards, to bring all its armaments and all its weapons within the general jurisdiction of the organization.

For these reasons, it is entirely wrong to suppose that the destructive aspects of atomic energy can be regarded as outside the purview of the United Nations Charter. On the contrary, they can be and are included within its scope. Therefore, I do not agree that it is necessary for us to concentrate on world government, i. e., establishing new machinery for some form of federal government. What is necessary is to concentrate on making the existing United Nations Organization a success.

Herbert Vere Evatt

All this shows how important it is to stress the positive factors of cooperation that must go into the setting up of a United Nations Organization and the building of a world community. Too many have overemphasized the fear that has been almost universally engendered by the atom bomb and suggested that this fear may stampede us into a solid world organization. But in my opinion fear can never prevent this positive creative quality. Fear may drive us underground. Fear may force us to disperse our industries. Fear may induce a nation to strike a first and decisive blow. But fear will not make us feel more kindly toward our neighbors, and this feeling of kindness and comradeship is vitally necessary if we are to have any world organization that will survive.

What is the task before us? What is needed is an abandonment of mere power politics and the support of all forms of international participation designed to meet the desperate needs of the peoples of the world. Let us not think that our present favored position and apparent economic security leave us immune from future economic disaster.

The urgent necessity of the displaced and starving peoples of Europe and Asia must be met by increasing the resources of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Food and Agriculture Organization should be given a larger role to play. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Organization must be assigned special tasks in furthering the development of resources in the interests of the people themselves. The trusteeship clauses of the Charter must be given practical application. There must be an extension of international cultural and scientific exchanges. With the peaceful development of atomic energy, the old economic conflict, the struggle for living room, the jealously guarded economic rights in power resources—all contributing to the likelihood of war—can be made things of the past. Mankind has the possibility of entering into a cultural heritage hitherto undreamed of.

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